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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MATCHING WITH ENDOGENOUS EFFORT
Behrang Kamali Shahdadi
Rakesh Vohra
This thesis extends the two-sided matching literature by including an endogenous eﬀort
choice after the matching stage. We examine how diﬀerent matching rules aﬀect incentives
to exert eﬀort and the costs paid to induce various eﬀort levels in three settings: a legal
system, an education system, and a labor market. In an indigent defense program, the
government provides counsel for indigent defendants. After the assignment of an attorney
to a defendant, the attorney exerts a costly eﬀort; however, the government only observes
a noisy signal of the eﬀort. We model the problem as a one-to-one matching problem with
moral hazard. We show that holding the total expenditure for counsel fixed and changing
the matching procedure to accommodate defendants’ and attorneys’ preferences, i.e., switch
from random matching to stable matching, defendants become worse oﬀ because a stable
matching exacerbates the moral hazard problem on the part of counsel. In in the second
case we consider a teacher who chooses a costly eﬀort after observing the distribution of
students assigned to his/her class. We model the problem as a many-to-one matching with
a costly non-contractible eﬀort choice. We show that the eﬀect of policies that aﬀect the
student assignment to classes, such as tracking, implementing school choice, and voucher
programs, depends on the curvature of teachers’ marginal utility of eﬀort. We find conditions
under which the argmax of a maximization problem is strictly supermodular or strictly
submodular. Subsequently, we characterize conditions under which sorting students based
on their academic performances increases (decreases) the total eﬀort of teachers and the
average performance of students. In the third setting, we consider a labor market in which
each worker chooses an eﬀort after assignment to a firm. The eﬀort choice, labor in this
setting, is observable and contractible. We show that the profit maximizing labor maximizes
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the total surplus of the match. Moreover, the unique matching in any equilibrium maximizes
the total surplus; however, this matching may have a lower total output compared with
any other matching. Stated diﬀerently, eliminating labor market frictions increases the
eﬃciency; however, it may increase or decrease the total output.
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CHAPTER 1 : Overview
This thesis extends the two-sided matching literature by including an endogenous eﬀort
choice after the matching stage. We study the application of matching with an endogenous
eﬀort choice in three settings: a legal system, an education system, and a labor market. In
the first setting, the matching is one-to-one and there is heterogeneity in both sides of the
market. However, the government pays the cost of each contract and there is no transfer
of utility between the two sides of the market. In this setting, only a noisy signal of eﬀort
is observable and contractible. In the second setting, the matching is many-to-one. We
consider two cases: a case where there is heterogeneity in both sides of the market and a
case where there is heterogeneity only in one side of the market. In this setting, eﬀort is
not contractible. In the third setting, the matching is one-to-one and there is heterogeneity
in both sides of the market. In this setting, utility is transferable between two sides and
eﬀort is observable and contractible. In the first setting, the uniform random matching is
more desirable than the stable matching. In the second setting, if the marginal utility of a
teacher is supermodular and convex in eﬀort, then the stable matching is the most desirable
matching; however, if the marginal utility of a teacher is submodular and concave in eﬀort,
then the stable matching is the least desirable matching. In the third setting, the stable
matching maximizes the total surplus; however, the total output under the stable matching
can be lower than any other matching.
In the second chapter, we model the problem of assigning counsel to indigent defendants as a
matching problem. A novel aspect of this matching problem is the moral hazard component
on the part of counsel. Within the model, we show that holding the total expenditure
for counsel fixed and changing the matching procedure to accommodate defendants’ and
attorneys’ preferences, i.e., switch from random matching to stable matching, defendants
become worse oﬀ because a stable matching exacerbates the moral hazard problem on the
part of counsel. In addition, we show that under suitable conditions random matching is
the eﬃcient way to allocate defendants to counsel.
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In the third chapter, we study the problem of sorting students based on their academic
performances and its eﬀect on teachers’ eﬀort choice. The eﬀect of sorting students based
on their academic performances depends not only on direct peer eﬀects but also on indirect peer eﬀects through teachers’ eﬀorts. We show that standard assumptions in the
literature are insuﬃcient to determine the eﬀect of sorting on the performances of students
and so are silent on the eﬀect of policies such as tracking, implementing school choice, and
voucher programs. In order to analyze the eﬀect of sorting on the total performance of
students, we need to understand the eﬀect of sorting on the total eﬀort of teachers, which
depends on supermodularity and submodularity of the argmax of teachers’ utility maximization problem. We find conditions under which the argmax of a maximization problem
is strictly supermodular or strictly submodular. We show that the eﬀect of policies such as
tracking, implementing school choice, and voucher programs depends on the curvature of
teachers’ marginal utility of eﬀort. We characterize conditions under which sorting increases
(decreases) the total eﬀort of teachers and the average performance of students.
In the fourth chapter, we model a labor market in which workers and firms are heterogeneous. A classic question in economics is the welfare consequences of diﬀerent allocations
of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous firms. Welfare is unobservable because the cost
of providing labor to the workers is unobservable. Many researchers use GDP instead of
the total surplus as a proxy for welfare. Within our model, the total output measures the
welfare only if the eﬀective labor supplied by workers does not depend on the firm they are
matched with. The assumption of fixed hours of labor supply may seem reasonable in a
market for unskilled labor; however, in a market for skilled labor it seems less plausible. We
show that if there is complementarities between a worker’s ability and a firm’s technology,
positive assortative matching (PAM) is the only matching in any equilibrium and it’s the
unique eﬃcient matching. However, the total output can be lower under PAM compared
with other matchings. We investigate the eﬀect of eliminating all friction, implementing a
centralized clearing house, in a labor market. We characterize two sets of suﬃcient conditions on the production function and cost function under which the total output and
2

welfare move in the same direction. Under the first set of conditions, the increase in total
output overestimates the eﬃciency gain. In contrast, under the second set of conditions,
the increase in the total output underestimates the eﬃciency gain. We identify a third set
of conditions under which the total output and welfare move in opposite directions.
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CHAPTER 2 : Matching with Moral Hazard: Assigning Attorneys to Indigent
Defendants
2.1. Introduction
Each year, more than a hundred thousand individuals in the U.S. who are too poor to
pay for counsel are subject to criminal prosecution.1 The Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution guarantees defendants the right to counsel in federal criminal prosecutions but
does not specify how this right is to be exercised. The U.S. Supreme Court expanded these
rights in a series of cases decided in the 1960s and 1970s. The most celebrated of these
being Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), in which the court held that a defendant charged with
a felony, including state crimes, had the right to government-provided counsel.
At present, the government provides counsel for indigent defendants using three diﬀerent
defender systems. The first is the practice of hiring defense attorneys from public defender
organizations, in which salaried staﬀ attorneys render criminal indigent defense services
through a public or private nonprofit organization or as direct government employees (Cohen
(2012)). The second is contract defense programs. In this system, contracts to represent
indigent defendants are awarded through an “auction.” The dollar value of the contract
and its duration are specified before the auction. Private attorneys, bar associations, or
law firms indicate their willingness to accept the specified contract. Then the government
awards the contract to a subset of participants based on their quality. The duration of each
contract is one year, and the dollar value is set in terms of a flat fee per criminal case or
hourly rate with a cap, which turns into a flat fee per case if the attorney’s work report
exceeds the cap. The third system is to use assigned counsel programs, in which a judge
assigns an attorney to the case, and the attorney accepts out of professional courtesy.
The common feature of all three systems is that the indigent defendant is not permitted to
choose his/her attorney. Schulhofer and Friedman (1993) summarize this state of aﬀairs as
1

Langton and Farole (2010) report, “In 2007, 957 public defender oﬃces across the nation received more
than 5.5 million indigent defense cases.”
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follows:
Most citizens would consider it shockingly unethical for an attorney representing
one side in a lawsuit to be selected or paid, even indirectly, by the opposing
party. Yet such principles are violated routinely in this country on a massive
scale. In criminal cases, the great majority of defense attorneys are paid directly
or indirectly by the prosecuting party, the state.
Drumgo v. Superior Court (1973) is an extreme example of the denial of choice. Fleeta
Drumgo and five others were each charged with five counts of murder, one count of conspiracy, and one count of assault while serving a state prison sentence. Four features made
Drumgo’s case special: A private attorney had to be appointed because the public defender’s
oﬃce was unable to serve. Richard Hodge, the attorney requested by Drumgo was qualified
and willing to represent Drumgo. Drumgo’s request for representation by Hodge preceded
the appointment of a diﬀerent private attorney by the trial judge. The trial judge denied
Drumgo’s request to be represented by Hodge. Subsequently, the court of appeals ordered
the trial judge to replace Drumgo’s court chosen counsel with Hodge. This decision was
overturned by the California Supreme Court on the grounds that the trial judge had the
discretionary power to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant (Tague (1974)).
In this paper, we take up the question of how counsel should be matched to indigent
defendants and analyze the eﬀect of allowing indigent defendants a choice. In our model,
the government moves first by announcing a contract. This is followed by an entry decision
by attorneys, and then using the announced selection process, the government selects which
attorneys to hire. Then there is a matching stage in which defendants are matched to hired
attorneys. Subsequently, each attorney decides whether to exert eﬀort for his/her assigned
client or shirk the responsibility. Because the government has to provide funding for this
system, the government is responsible for designing the contract using a selection process, a
matching process, and a wage contract. To put it diﬀerently, a contract specifies a selection
process, a matching process, and a wage contract.

5

What distinguishes this problem from other matching problems considered in the literature
is the moral hazard component. The government that is charged with matching defendants
to attorneys must ensure that suﬃcient incentives exist for each attorney to exert eﬀort on
behalf of his/her assigned defendant.
There is much evidence of a moral hazard problem in the representation of indigent defendants, especially under private contractor systems. Furthermore, shirking can be grounds
for appeal (see Strickland v. Washington (1984)). One vivid instance of moral hazard comes
from McDuﬃe County, Georgia. In an eﬀort to cut costs on indigent defense, a contract was
awarded to Bill Wheeler, who oﬀered to perform all the county’s indigent defense work for
$25, 000, almost $20, 000 lower than the other two bids and $21, 000 lower than the previous
year’s cost. As part of his contract, Wheeler continued to maintain a private practice as
well. As Lemos (2000) reports, “most of Wheeler’s indigent clients met him for the first
time in court. After a brief, whispered conversation, Wheeler would recommend a guilty
plea.” Between 1993 and 1998, Wheeler filed only seven motions and tried only 14 cases in
court, of which only two were jury trials.
The first part of this paper justifies the denial of choice in the indigent defense system. We
compare the indigent defense system under three diﬀerent matching rules. The first rule
assigns indigent defendants uniformly at random to counsel. We view this as representative
of how defendants are currently matched with counsel (Schulhofer and Friedman (1993) and
Cohen (2012)). We then consider a setting in which defendants are permitted to choose a
counsel from the same group of attorneys as before. Indeed, Tague (1974) and Schulhofer
and Friedman (1993) have all argued for giving defendants a greater say in the choice of
counsel. Schulhofer and Friedman (1993), in particular, suggest the use of vouchers. We
model the outcome of such a voucher system as a stable matching; however, under the
voucher system, the group of attorneys who are assigned to indigent defendants may be
diﬀerent. We show that holding the government’s budget fixed, changing the matching
from random to stable, i.e., accommodating defendants’ and attorneys’ preferences, makes
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defendants worse oﬀ. Moreover, we show that using a voucher system, i.e., using a stable
matching and changing the set of hired attorneys, makes the indigent defendants worse
oﬀ. There are two main reasons why permitting defendants a choice makes them worse oﬀ.
First, institutional restrictions require that wage contracts be nondiscriminatory, i.e., the
government cannot give diﬀerent wages to diﬀerent attorneys for diﬀerent cases.2 Under
this restriction, if the government changes the matching rule from uniform random to stable,
then there will be an attorney who knows that he/she will get the worst case after signing
the contract. Hence, this attorney’s participation constraint is violated under the previous
wage contract. To satisfy this attorney’s participation constraint, the government raises
every attorney’s wage contract. As a result, given a fixed budget, the government can’t hire
enough attorneys and incentivize them to exert eﬀort.
The second reason is risk aversion on the part of the attorneys. The government has
to compensate for the disutility of exerting eﬀort for each attorney by providing a wage
contract. Under the uniform random matching, the government has to compensate all
attorneys for the expected disutility of exerting eﬀort. However, under stable matching, each
attorney is assigned to a specific indigent defendant, and the government has to compensate
attorneys for diﬀerent costs of exerting high eﬀort. Consider a case in which hired attorneys
have the same reservation wage and attorneys are risk averse, i.e., their utility function for
money is concave. The cheapest way for the government to compensate all of them is
to give them a uniform lottery over all indigent defendants and the same wage contract
because their utility function for money is concave. In section 2.5, we formally show that
after relaxing the institutional restriction to only nondiscriminatory wage contracts, if a
condition on reservation wages of a subset of attorneys and a condition on cost function
are satisfied, the government will optimally choose a nondiscriminatory contract and the
uniform random matching.
The second part of this paper explores an optimal allocation and an optimal contract.
2

We discuss reasons for restriction to nondiscriminatory wage contracts in section 2.5.
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We characterize the optimal allocation of attorneys to indigent defendants, in which an
allocation is a lottery over diﬀerent matchings. We show that if the reservation wage of all
hired attorneys is the same, the uniform random matching is optimal. In addition, if the
cost function is separable, then the status quo indigent defense system is using the optimal
contract, even if the government is allowed to use any discriminatory wage contract and any
allocation of attorneys to indigent defendants.

2.2. Model
There is a finite set of indigent defendants J, and |J| = N . The diﬃculty of each indigent
defendant j ∈ J’s case is exogenously given and denoted by dj ∈ D.3 Index indigent
defendants according to their case diﬃculty, i.e., dj ≤ dj+1 ∀j ∈ J. There is a finite set of
available attorneys I a , and the number of available attorneys exceeds the number of indigent
defendants, i.e., |I a | > |J|. Each attorney i ∈ I a has an exogenous quality qi ∈ Q.4 Index
attorneys in I a according to their quality, qi ≤ qi+1

∀i ∈ I a . Each indigent defendant

is in need of an attorney. By law, the government has to provide each indigent defendant
with one attorney. Furthermore, the government has to ensure that each indigent defendant
receives representation that satisfies the “eﬀective assistance of counsel” criterion, which we
discuss later.
The game begins with the government announcing a contract. A contract specifies a selection rule, an allocation rule, and a wage contract, all of which we define later. Attorneys
decide to participate given the announced contract. Denote the set of attorneys who participate by I p ⊆ I a .
The government hires a subset of participating attorneys based on the announced selection
rule. The set of hired attorneys is denoted by I ⊆ I p . The government has to hire N
attorneys to ensure that each indigent defendant has an attorney. If |I| < N , then the
3
One can interpret the diﬃculty of a case by the type of indigent defendant or the type of case assigned
to the indigent defendant.
4
One can determine the quality of an attorney by the amount of experience he/she has and the law school
from which he/she graduated (Iyengar (2007)).
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constitutional right of at least one indigent defendant is violated; hence, we require that
|I| = N for an indigent defense system. Based on the announced allocation rule, attorneys
are assigned to a defendant. Subsequently, each attorney decides to exert high eﬀort or low
eﬀort, denoted by e ∈ {el , eh }, on behalf of his/her assigned client.
A wage contract (w1 , w2 ) specifies payments to hired attorneys based on a noisy signal of
the attorney’s eﬀort level. The eﬀort is not observable by the government; therefore, it’s
not contactable. Based on the announced wage contract, each attorney is paid a contingent
wage, i.e., w1 if the signal is s1 and w2 if the signal is s2 . The signal s ∈ {s1 , s2 } follows
the distribution pl = P r(s2 |el ), ph = P r(s2 |eh ). s2 is more likely if the attorney exerts a
high eﬀort rather than a low eﬀort, i.e., ph > pl . To put it diﬀerently, s2 is good news
about the attorney’s eﬀort being high, and s1 is a bad news about the attorney’s eﬀort
being high. The signal can be the number of visits before the trial that the attorney had
with his client, the number of motions that the attorney filed, and other indicators of the
attorney’s eﬀort. The government cannot rely on an indigent defendant’s report about the
attorney’s eﬀort, because every convicted indigent defendant will use his/her own report as
grounds for appealing the court’s decision.
An attorney with quality qi has an outside option r(qi ). If attorney i gets hired, his/her
payoﬀ is u(w) − c(e, d), which is determined by wage, eﬀort, and diﬃculty of the assigned
case.
The government wants to minimize the sum of the expected payments to hired attorneys,
∑
i.e., i∈I ph w2 +(1−ph )w1 , subject to providing every indigent defendant with one attorney
who satisfies the minimum eﬀort condition. Each attorney must choose high eﬀort eh in
compliance with the eﬀective assistance standard specified in the Strickland v. Washington
(1984) ruling. In Strickland v. Washington (1984), the court announced the standard for
evaluating postconviction claims of ineﬀective assistance.
Assumption 1

(i) u(w) is strictly increasing, continuous, and strictly concave in w.
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(ii) High eﬀort costs more than low eﬀort, i.e., c(eh , dj ) > c(el , dj ) for any dj ∈ D.
(iii) r(qi ) is nondecreasing in qi .
(iv) c(eh , d) is nondecreasing in d and c(eh , d1 ) ̸= c(eh , dN ).
(v) c(eh , d) − c(el , d) is nondecreasing in d.
Assumptions 1-i and 1-ii on the utility function and the cost function are standard in moral
hazard literature; strict concavity of u(w) follows from risk aversion of attorneys. The main
result of the paper holds for risk-neutral attorneys as well. Assumption 1-iii about the
reservation wage is plausible because the quality of an attorney is a qualitative measure,
which represents demand for an attorney. More demand corresponds to a higher reservation
wage. The first part of Assumption 1-iv is without loss of generality because we determined
the order of the indigent defendants based on the diﬃculty of their case; however, the
order of these diﬃculties are not specified. To put it diﬀerently, we can define a new
diﬃculty measure for each case such that c(eh , d) is nondecreasing in d. The second part
of Assumption 1-iv is satisfied if at least two indigent defendants have cases with diﬀerent
costs of exerting high eﬀort. Assumption 1-v (increasing diﬀerences assumption) states that
if the cost of exerting high eﬀort for case j is higher than that for case j ′ , then the diﬀerence
between the cost of exerting high eﬀort and low eﬀort for case j should be higher than the
diﬀerence between the cost of exerting high eﬀort and low eﬀort for case j ′ . We assume
that all attorneys in I p have a weak incentive to participate, and all other attorneys have
a strict incentive not to participate in the indigent defense system.
The government selects a subset of attorneys to represent indigent defendants from the set
of participating attorneys. A selection rule is a mapping from the power set of I a into
˜ ⊆ I˜ ∀I˜ ⊆ I a . To put it diﬀerently, there is a set of
the power set of I a , such that Γ(I)
available attorneys I a , a subset of this set will participate I p , and then the government uses
the specified selection rule Γ to hire a subset of this set I = Γ(I p ).
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Given a set of hired attorneys I, a matching is a one-to-one mapping µ : J → I. Denote
the set of all matchings by M(I). An allocation λ(I) = (λµ (I))µ∈M(I) is a probability
distribution over the set of all matchings. An allocation determines how to (randomly)
assign a given set of attorneys to a set of indigent defendants. For each matching µ ∈ M(I),
∑
0 ≤ λµ (I) ≤ 1 and µ∈M(I) λµ (I) = 1. Denote the set of all λ(I) by ∆M(I). Given an
allocation λ(I), define ϕλ (I)(i, j) as the probability that attorney i ∈ I matches with
indigent j ∈ J. Define Φλ as N × N matrix, where element (i, j) is ϕλ (i, j). Note that
Φλ is a doubly stochastic matrix. A random allocation, λ(I), is an allocation such that
∃i ∈ I, ∃j ∈ J : 0 < ϕλ (i, j) < 1. Under a random allocation, at least one attorney does not
know his assigned case when he/she signs the contract.
The government needs to announce an allocation for each set of hired attorneys. The
government can announce the same rule for all sets of hired attorneys or the government
can use diﬀerent allocations for diﬀerent sets of hired attorneys. In sections 2.3 and 2.4, the
government uses the same allocation no matter which attorneys are defending the indigent
defendants. However, in section 2.5, we specify an optimal allocation for each set of hired
attorneys.
˜ I˜ ⊆ I a , |I|
˜ = N }.
Define Ω(I a ) to be the set of all subsets of I a of size N , i.e., Ω(I a ) = {I|
An allocation rule Λ is a mapping from Ω(I a ) to ∆M(I), Λ : Ω(I a ) → ∆M(I), i.e., Λ
specifies a probability distribution λ over matchings for any subset of size N of I a .

2.3. Alternative Indigent Defense Systems
We compare the current indigent defense system (status quo) with two alternatives: an
indigent defense system that uses a stable matching (stable matching system) and an indigent defense system that uses vouchers (a voucher system). First, we solve for an optimal
wage contract for a given allocation λ and a selection rule Γ. Using this wage contract, we
analyze the status quo indigent defense system, an indigent defense system under a stable
matching, and an indigent defense system that uses vouchers.
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An indigent defense system under a stable matching gives indigent defendants and attorneys
the right to choose each other. However, the attorneys are selected by the government before
the matching stage. Under a stable matching, an indigent defendant chooses an attorney
from the set of attorneys selected by the government. If the attorney accepts, then he/she
is matched to the defendant.
A voucher indigent defense system allows indigent defendants to select any attorney from the
set of available attorneys. Under a voucher indigent defense system, the government does
not select attorneys before the matching stage. In other words, the set of hired attorneys
under a voucher indigent defense system is diﬀerent from the set of hired attorneys under the
status quo indigent defense system. The outcome of a voucher system is a stable matching.
2.3.1. Optimal wage contract for a given allocation and selection rule
We find the optimal wage contract from the government’s point of view subject to two sets of
constraints. First, the government wants to hire attorneys in the set I = {k ′ , . . . , k +N −1}.
Second, the government wants every attorney who is hired to exert high eﬀort no matter
which case the attorney is assigned to. The objective of the government is to minimize the
expected cost of providing counsel to indigent defendants.
Define u1 = u(w1 ), u2 = u(w2 ). Hence a wage contract (w1 , w2 ) in the utility measure is
(u1 , u2 ). Define h(.) = u−1 (.). Under Assumption 1, h(.) is strictly convex.

5

The following optimization problem identifies the optimal wage contract (u∗1 , u∗2 ) for a given
5
Such notations make the problem of finding the optimal way of implementing an action a convex programming problem (see Grossman and Hart (1983)).
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λ, such that any attorney i ∈ I is willing to participate and exert high eﬀort:

minu1 ,u2

∑
i∈I

ph h(u2 ) + (1 − ph )h(u1 )

s.t.
(ph − pl )(u2 − u1 ) ≥ c(eh , d) − c(el , d) ∀d ∈ D

(IC),

u1 + ph (u2 − u1 ) ≥ r(qi ) + Eλi (c(eh , d)) ∀i ∈ I

(IR),

where:
Eλi (c(eh , d)) =

∑

ϕλ (i, j)c(eh , dj ),

j∈J

is the expected cost of exerting high eﬀort under the allocation λ for attorney i. Observe
that because of restriction to nondiscriminatory wage contracts, the objective function can
be simplified to:
∑

ph h(u2 ) + (1 − ph )h(u1 ) = N (ph h(u2 ) + (1 − ph )h(u1 )).

i∈I

Note that the only place that allocation enters the government’s problem for determining
an optimal wage contract is in the right-hand side of individual rationality (IR) constraints.
Incentive compatibility (IC) constraints hold for ∀d ∈ D and ∀i ∈ I because the government
wants all attorneys to exert high eﬀort for every case. Observe that (IC) is the same for
∀i ∈ I. Therefore, we need to consider (IC) ∀d ∈ D. (IR) is satisfied only in expectation
because attorneys are committed to accept any case assigned to them under λ.
We solve the government’s problem for selecting an optimal wage contract, an optimal
allocation rule, and an optimal selection rule in two steps. First, for any given allocation
rule and selection rule, find the optimal wage contract u∗1 , u∗2 . Then using the optimal
wage contract, in the second step, find an optimal allocation rule and an optimal selection
rule. Lemma 1 specifies the optimal wage contract w1∗ , w2∗ or equivalently u∗1 , u∗2 for a given
allocation rule and selection rule.
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Lemma 1 Given Assumption 1, for a fixed allocation λ and a fixed set of hired attorneys
I, the optimal wage contract is:
u∗1 = Rλ − ph

( c(eh ,dN )−c(el ,dN ) )
ph −pl

,

(2.1)

(
)
l ,dN )
u∗2 = Rλ + (1 − ph ) c(eh ,dNph)−c(e
,
−pl

(2.2)

where Rλ is:
Rλ = max{r(qi ) + Eλi (c(eh , d))}i∈I .

Proof: See the appendix.
2.3.2. Status quo
The uniform random allocation, λu (I), selects each element of M(I) with equal probability,
i.e., it selects a matching from M(I) uniformly at random. Observe that under the uniform
random allocation, any element of I has the same uniform probability of matching to any
element of J, i.e., for any i ∈ I and any j ∈ J, ϕλu (i, j) =

1
N.

The uniform random

allocation rule Λu , specifies the uniform random allocation for any set I ∈ Ω(I a ).
The status quo system for assigning counsel to defendants does not rely on the preferences
of defendants and attorneys. The status quo allocation rule that the government uses is
the uniform random allocation rule (Cohen (2012) and Schulhofer and Friedman (1993)).
Furthermore, under the status quo system, the government selects the N highest quality
attorneys from set I p (Schulhofer and Friedman (1993)). We call this selection rule the
merit-based selection rule.
In our model, under the uniform random allocation, the government is indiﬀerent between
selecting which N attorneys from set I p to hire because fixing a nondiscriminatory wage
contract the cost of hiring any attorney from the set of participating attorneys is the same.
Hence, the government is behaving optimally when it uses the merit-based selection rule.
We denote the index of the highest element of this set by k + N − 1, i.e., qk+N −1 ≥ qi ∀i ∈ I p
14

and k + N − 1 ∈ I p . Hence the set of hired attorneys under the merit-based selection rule
is {k, k + 1, ..., k + N − 1}. To put it diﬀerently, given λu and a (w1 , w2 ), the government
is indiﬀerent between diﬀerent selection rules Γ as long as |Γ(I p )| = N . One such selection
rule is the merit-based selection rule. To model the status quo indigent defense system,
we use the merit-based selection rule that the government currently uses (Schulhofer and
Friedman (1993)). Under the uniform random allocation, Rλ depends on r(qK+N −1 ) only,
i.e., given the set I p , which depends on u∗1 , u∗2 , the government’s cost does not depend on
other elements of I. Hence, the government hires the highest-quality attorneys from set I p ,
i.e., the government uses the merit-based selection rule. Note that r(qi ) is a nondecreasing
function, not a strictly increasing function; therefore, it may be the case that |I p | > N .
In this case, because the cost of a contract with each attorney in I p is the same for the
government, the government is indiﬀerent, so the government selects the highest-quality
attorneys.
The optimal wage contract under uniform random allocation is:
u∗1 = r(qk+N −1 ) + Ed (c(eh , d)) − ph

( c(eh ,dN )−c(el ,dN ) )

u∗2 = r(qk+N −1 ) + Ed (c(eh , d)) + (1 − ph )

where Ed (c(eh , d)) =

1
N

ph −pl

,

( c(eh ,dN )−c(el ,dN ) )
ph −pl

(2.3)
,

(2.4)

∑N

j=1 c(eh , dj ).

The cost of this indigent defense system for the government is:
(
Cu = N

(
(
))
c (eh , dN ) − c (el , dN )
(1 − ph ) h r (qk+N −1 ) + Ed (c (eh , d)) − ph
+
ph − pl
)) )
(
(
c (eh , dN ) − c (el , dN )
.
ph h r (qk+N −1 ) + Ed (c (eh , d)) + (1 − ph )
ph − pl

We view the status quo contract as the merit-based selection rule, the uniform random
allocation rule, and the wage contract specified in equations (2.3) and (2.4). We view Cu as
the budget of the status quo indigent defense system.
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The following lemma characterizes the set of attorneys who would participate under the
specified optimal wage contract, the uniform random allocation rule, and the merit selection
rule. Recall that the index of the highest-quality attorney who participates is k + N − 1
and any attorney with an index above k + N − 1 does not participate.
Although the government is using the merit-based selection rule, hired attorneys are not the
highest-quality attorneys available. The government uses the wage contract to incentivize
attorneys to participate in the indigent defense system. If the wage contract is designed for
the N lowest quality attorneys, then attorneys with reservation wages higher than r(qN )
will not participate. Lemma 2 shows that, even under merit-based selection rule, any hired
attorney has a reservation wage of at most r(qN ). If we consider the reservation wage as
a signal for an attorney’s quality, we can conclude that the government is hiring attorneys
with quality close to N lowest-quality attorneys.
Lemma 2 Under the status quo contract the reservation wage of highest-quality attorney
who participates is strictly lower than the reservation wages of attorneys who abstain, i.e.,
r(qk+N −1 ) < r(qk+N ). Furthermore, if k > 1, then reservation wages r(qi ) for all i =
N, N + 1, . . . , k + N − 1 are the same.
Proof: The expected utility of attorney k + N from participating in the indigent defense
system is strictly less than his/her outside option r(qk+N ), otherwise he/she would participate in the indigent defense system. Moreover, the expected utility of attorney k + N − 1
from participating in the indigent defense system is at least r(qk+N −1 ). Under the uniform
random allocation rule, the expected utility of attorney k + N from participating in the
indigent defense system is equal to the expected utility of attorney k + N − 1 from participating in the indigent defense system. Hence, their outside options can not be equal, i.e.,
r(qk+N −1 ) ̸= r(qk+N ).
Suppose there exists attorney i′ such that N ≤ i′ < N + k − 1 and r(qN +k−1 ) > r(qi′ ). By
hiring attorneys i′ − N + 1, ..., i′ , the government satisfies all the equilibrium constraints,
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and the expected cost is lower than hiring attorneys k, ..., N + k − 1 because Cu is a strictly
increasing function of r(qk+N −1 ), a contradiction.

2.3.3. An indigent’s right to an attorney of his/her choice
In this section, we study two indigent defense systems that permit defendants and attorneys
to choose each other. A stable matching characterizes the outcome of incorporating the
preferences of indigent defendants and attorneys. There are many arguments in favor of
defendants’ and attorneys’ right to choose.
Tague (1974) and Schulhofer and Friedman (1993) have argued for giving defendants a
greater say in their choice of counsel. There is a natural conflict of interest between the
indigent’s attorney and the prosecution side, hence giving the power of selecting and funding
of both sides to one oﬃce will result in a conflict of interest. Moreover, other government
funded systems, such as health care and the education system, incorporate the preferences of
two sides of the market; one such instance is vouchers in education systems. The outcome of
a system that gives indigent defendants and attorneys a choice is a stable matching. Gale
and Shapley (1962) define a stable matching: A matching is stable if no matched agent
prefers to be single and no pair of agents prefers each other to their assigned partner in the
matching.
Schulhofer and Friedman (1993) suggest a voucher system for an indigent defense system.
The outcome of a voucher system is a stable matching. However, under a voucher system,
the set of attorneys who get hired is diﬀerent than the set of attorneys who get hired under
the status quo indigent defense system of assigning attorneys to indigent defendants. We
consider a diﬀerent set of hired attorneys under the voucher system when we compare the
outcome of status quo indigent defense system with a voucher system.
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Stable matching
First, we define a stable matching and a positive assortative matching. We show that all
stable matchings are positive assortative matchings. Hence, we can restrict our attention
to positive assortative matchings. At the end, we discuss the optimal wage contract under
a stable matching.
To define a stable matching, we specify preferences for indigent defendants and attorneys.
For a fixed wage contract, each indigent defendant j has a preference over attorneys denoted
by ≺j . If two attorneys exert the same amount of eﬀort, all indigent defendants prefer the
attorney with the higher quality to the attorney with the lower quality, i.e., if qi < qi′ then
i ≺j i′ , ∀j ∈ J. Moreover, if qi = qi′ , then every indigent defendant is indiﬀerent between
attorney i and attorney i′ . Given a wage contract, each attorney i ∈ I a has a preference
over cases denoted by ≺i . Each attorney prefers a case that gives him/her a higher utility
to a case that gives him a lower utility under the specified wage contract. Furthermore, if
an attorney is not committed to accepting at least one case and a case that gives him/her a
strictly lower utility than his/her outside option, then he/she prefers his/her outside option.
Under a nondiscriminatory wage contract, all attorneys prefer cases with lower disutility
of high eﬀort, i.e., if c(eh , dj ) < c(eh , dj ′ ) then j ′ ≺i j, ∀i ∈ I a . Moreover, if c(eh , dj ) =
c(eh , dj ′ ), then every attorney is indiﬀerent between case j and case j ′ . Using the preferences
of both sides of this market, we can define stable matching and a positive assortative
matching for a fixed wage contract and find their relationship.
For a fixed wage contract, a matching µ is stable if:
1. Every attorney prefers his/her match to his/her outside option, i.e., γi ≺i µ−1 (i), ∀i ∈
I, where γi is the attorney’s outside option. Note that any indigent defendant prefers
any attorney to his/her outside option.
2. There is no blocking pair. A blocking pair is (i, j) such that µ(j) ̸= i, µ−1 (i) ≺i j and

18

µ(j) ≺j i.
For a fixed wage contract, a positive assortative matching is a matching such that:
1. For any i, i′ ∈ I if qi < qi′ then µ−1 (i) ≺i′ µ−1 (i′ ).
2. For any j, j ′ ∈ J if c(eh , dj ) > c(eh , dj ′ ) then µ(j) ≺j ′ µ(j ′ ).
Lemma 3 specifies the relationship between stable matching and a positive assortative
matching.
Lemma 3 Under any nondiscriminatory wage contract, if all attorneys have an incentive
to exert high eﬀort, any stable matching is a positive assortative matching.
Proof: Suppose there exists a stable matching µ that is not a positive assortative matching,
i.e., there exist i, i′ and j, j ′ such that µ(j) = i, µ(j ′ ) = i′ , qi < qi′ and c(eh , dj ) < c(eh , dj ′ ).
Then (i′ , j) is a blocking pair, because j ′ ≺i′ j and i ≺j i′ . Therefore, the matching µ is
not stable, a contradiction.

Consider an indigent defense system that uses a positive assortative matching. Each attorney at the ex-ante stage of the game, i.e., deciding to participate in the system or abstain,
knows exactly which case diﬃculty he will face. Under a positive assortative matching, if
there exist an attorney i and case j such that 0 < ϕ(i, j) < 1, then c(eh , dj ) = c(eh , dj ′ ) for
any other case j ′ ∈ J with 0 < ϕ(i, j ′ ) < 1.
The following optimization solves for the optimal wage contract for hiring attorneys from
the set I = {k, ..., k + N − 1}, under a positive assortative matching λs , when they have
incentive to exert high eﬀort:
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minu1 ,u2

∑k+N −1
i=k

ph h(u2 ) + (1 − ph )h(u1 )

s.t.
(ph − pl )(u2 − u1 ) ≥ c(eh , d) − c(el , d)∀d ∈ D,
u1 + ph (u2 − u1 ) ≥ r(qi ) + (c(eh , dk+N −i ))∀i ∈ I.

We can show that the incentive constraint for the highest d binds.6 The matching is a
positive assortative, so we need to find qĩ such that r(qĩ ) + (c(eh , dk+N −i )) is maximized.
We can relax this problem and only consider the (IR) for qk . Attorney k will get case
∗∗
N . We can find a lower bound on an optimal wage contract, denote this by (u∗∗
1 , u2 ), by

relaxing the problem and only considering (IR) for the attorney with the lowest quality,
i.e., attorney k:7
u∗∗
1 ≥ r(qk ) + c(eh , dN ) − ph

( c(eh ,dN )−c(el ,dN ) )
ph −pl

,

( c(eh ,dN )−c(el ,dN ) )
u∗∗
.
2 ≥ r(qk ) + c(eh , dN ) + (1 − ph )
ph −pl

(2.5)
(2.6)

Voucher system
Critics of the status quo indigent defense system have proposed the use of a voucher indigent defense system because this system gives indigent defendants the right to choose their
attorneys. In a voucher indigent defense system, the government gives each indigent defendant a voucher that specifies a wage contract for the attorney who accepts the defendant’s
case.
Given that every indigent defendant has the same voucher, all indigent defendants will go
6

See the proof of Lemma 1.
Note that this is a lower bound on an optimal wage contract for any indigent defense system that uses
a matching with the following property: Attorney k′ , where k′ ≥ k, is assigned to case N with probability
1, i.e., ∃k′ ≥ k such that ϕ(k′ , N ) = 1. Negative assortative matching is one example. All the results in
section 2.4 hold for this type of indigent defense system as well.
7
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to their most preferred attorney in the first round, i.e., they will go to i∗ ∈ I a , where
i ≺j i∗ ∀i ∈ I a , ∀j ∈ J. Then i∗ will either accept his/her most preferred case, i.e., j ∗ where
j ≺i∗ j ∗ , ∀j ∈ J, in this case (i∗ , j ∗ ) are matched, or i∗ will reject all indigent defendants’
proposals. The same process happens for the remaining indigent defendants and attorneys
until every indigent defendant is matched with one attorney or there are no remaining
attorneys. At the end, if every indigent defendant has an attorney, the allocation is a
positive assortative matching.

2.4. Comparison of Alternative Indigent Defense Systems
In this section, we compare the status quo with two alternative indigent defense systems:
a stable matching system and a voucher system. First, we define the measure for these
comparisons. Second, we specify the assumption that we need for these comparisons.
If the cost of providing the same N attorneys who exert high eﬀort is lower under the one
contract compared with another contract, then we say that the first contract is superior
to the second contract. Consider two indigent defense systems with diﬀerent contracts.
Suppose the first contract is superior to the second contract. Moreover, the budget of the
second indigent defense system is set equal to the budget of the first system. Then an
indigent defense system that uses the second contract will result in one of the following:
Either eﬀective representation requirement for at least one indigent defendant is violated,
i.e., at least one attorney is choosing el . Or the quality of the lowest-quality attorney under
this contract is strictly lower than the quality of lowest-quality attorney under the superior
contract.
Assumption 2 r(qN ) − r(q1 ) < c(eh , dN ) − Ed (c(eh , d)).
Intuitively, the match-specific part of the utility function varies more than the reservation
wage of the N lowest-quality attorneys. Assumption 2 states that the diﬀerence between the
reservation wages of the N lowest-quality attorneys in the set I a is less than the diﬀerence
between the cost of exerting high eﬀort when matched with the highest cost case and the
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expected cost of exerting high eﬀort when matched uniformly at random. The N lowestquality available attorneys have a very similar outside option. Therefore, their reservation
wages are close to each other.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the status quo contract is superior to any contract
that uses a positive assortative matching.
Proof: We show that the cost of the government under a positive assortative matching for
hiring I = {k, ..., k +N −1} is strictly greater than the cost of the government under random
allocation for hiring all attorneys in I. Recall that under the uniform random allocation
rule r(qN ) = r(qk+N −1 ), so:
r(qk+N −1 ) + Ed (c(eh , d)) = r(qN ) + Ed (c(eh , d)) < r(q1 ) + c(eh , dN ) ≤ r(qk ) + c(eh , dN ),
which implies that:
∗
∗∗
u∗1 < u∗∗
1 , u2 < u 2 .

Because h(.) is a strictly increasing function, we have:
∗
∗∗
h(u∗1 ) < h(u∗∗
1 ), h(u2 ) < h(u2 )

⇒

k+N
∑−1

ph h(u∗2 ) + (1 − ph )h(u∗1 ) <

i=k

k+N
∑−1

∗∗
ph h(u∗∗
2 ) + (1 − ph )h(u1 ).

i=k

Theorem 1 states that under the status quo system budget, using a positive assortative
matching instead of the uniform random allocation, and using the same set of attorneys,
the government cannot induce every attorney to exert high eﬀort. Theorem 1 shows that
permitting indigent defendants and attorneys to choose each other, given the same budget
that the status quo indigent defense system has, will result in a worse indigent defense
system from the indigent defendants’ point of view.
Lemma 3 states that any stable matching is a positive assortative matching. Theorem
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1 implies the following statement about the comparison between status quo and a stable
matching system.
Corollary 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the status quo contract that uses the uniform
random allocation is superior to any contract that uses any stable matching.
There are two reasons that Theorem 1 and corollary 1 hold: restriction of using only
nondiscriminatory wage contracts and the risk aversion of attorneys.
The first reason is the restriction of using only nondiscriminatory wage contracts. Under
any positive assortative matching, the lowest-quality attorney in set I is matched to the
most diﬃcult case. Consider the participation constraint of this attorney under the status
quo contract and under any contract that uses a positive assortative matching. The reservation wage of this attorney is the same under these two contracts. However, the expected
disutility of eﬀort is strictly larger under a positive assortative matching. Therefore, the
government has to increase the wage contract for this attorney to satisfy his participation
constraint. The wage contract is nondiscriminatory; therefore, increasing a wage contract
for one attorney implies that wage contracts are increased for every hired attorney. The cost
of the government is strictly increasing in u1 and u2 ; hence, an increase in the wage contract
of every attorney increases the cost of the indigent defense system for the government. Note
that this argument doesn’t depend on the risk aversion of attorneys.
The second reason is the risk aversion on the part of attorneys. Consider an example with
two cases and two attorneys with the same reservation wages. In this example, suppose
the government can pay the attorneys diﬀerent wages. The government has to compensate
the attorneys’ expected disutility of eﬀort and their forgone reservation wage. Under a
positive assortative matching, the low-quality attorney is matched to the diﬃcult case and
the high-quality attorney is matched to the easy case. Recall that u(w) is strictly concave.
Therefore, it is cheaper for the government to pay equal wages to both attorneys and use the
uniform random allocation, instead of paying a very high wage to the low-quality attorney
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and a low wage to the high-quality attorney. The role of risk aversion is discussed in more
detail in section 2.5.
The following lemma shows that risk aversion is not essential for this result and that without
risk aversion the same conclusion is true.
Lemma 4 If the attorneys are risk neutral, i.e., u(w) = w, Theorem 1 holds, i.e., the
status quo contract is superior to any contract that uses a positive assortative matching.
Proof: Given the set I and λ, the minimum cost for the government to hire all attorneys
in I and induce every i ∈ I to exert high eﬀort is C:
C=

minu1 ,u2

∑k+N −1
i=k

ph w2 + (1 − ph )w1

s.t.
(ph − pl )(w2 − w1 ) ≥ c(eh , d) − c(el , d),
∀d ∈ D,

∀i ∈ I,

w1 + ph (w2 − w1 ) ≥ r(qi ) + Eλi (c(eh , d)),
∀i ∈ I.

Note that the left-hand side of (IR) is equal to

1
N

of C. In order to find C, we need to find

which (IR) binds. Hence, the cost of the government given the set I is:
C = N × Rλ .

Under the uniform random allocation, the cost of the government is:
Cu = N × (r(qk+N −1 ) + Ed c(eh , d)).
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Under a positive assortative matching, the cost of the government is:
Cs = N × Rλ ≥ N × (r(qk ) + c(eh , dN )).
The inequality follows from the definition of Rλ . Hence, under Assumption 2, Cu < Cs , i.e.,
given the same budget that the status quo system has, the outcome of the indigent defense
system under any stable matching is worse than the outcome of the indigent defense system
under the uniform random allocation.

Next, we compare the outcome of the status quo indigent defense system with the outcome
of a voucher system. Under a voucher system, indigent defendants and attorneys have
the right to choose each other; hence, the allocation λ is not a choice of the government.
Moreover, the indigent defendants can choose the set of hired attorneys, i.e., selection rule Γ
is not under the government’s control. These two features make a voucher indigent defense
system an interesting alternative system at first glance. However, the following theorem
shows that the status quo contract is superior to any contract that uses a voucher system.
In order to do this comparison, we find a lower bound on the cost of the optimal wage
contract from the government’s point of view, under a positive assortative matching as the
allocation rule. Recall that the allocation under a voucher system is a positive assortative
matching. Under a voucher system, we consider any set of hired attorneys with size N ,
where attorneys’ qualities are at least qk . One possible set of hired attorneys under a
voucher system is {k, ..., k + N − 1}. We require the wage optimal contract to give the hired
attorneys incentive to exert high eﬀort under a voucher system.
Theorem 2 Given Assumptions 1 and 2, under the status quo system’s budget, switching
from the status quo contract to any contract that uses a voucher system results in one of
the following:
1. At least one indigent defendant doesn’t have an attorney.

25

2. At least one hired attorney doesn’t have suﬃcient incentive to exert high eﬀort.
3. The quality and the reservation wage of the lowest-quality attorney among hired attorneys is strictly lower than the quality and the reservation wage of the lowest-quality
attorney among hired attorneys under the status quo contract.
Proof: From equations 2.5 and 2.6, we know that the cost of the government under any
stable matching, such that the quality of each attorney is at least qk , is at least N (ph h(u∗∗
2 )+
∗∗
∗∗
∗∗
∗∗
(1−ph )h(u∗∗
1 )), because h(.) is strictly increasing in u1 and u2 , N (ph h(u2 )+(1−ph )h(u1 ))

is a lower bound on the cost of the government under a positive assortative matching, too.
If we show that the cost of the government under a voucher system for hiring the set I
is greater than the cost of the government under the uniform random allocation rule for
hiring I, then we can conclude that the cost of the government for hiring N attorneys using
a voucher system such that the quality of each attorney is at least qk is greater than the
cost of the government under the uniform random allocation for hiring I. We proved this
in Theorem 1, so no matter which set of attorneys from set I a are recruited under the
voucher system, as long as their quality is above qk given the same budget, the outcome
of the system under the uniform random allocation is superior to the outcome under the
voucher system. We do not consider the situation in which a voucher system results in some
unmatched indigent defendants, or some indigent defendants are matched with attorneys
with quality lower than qk , because in these situations it is clear that the status quo contract
is superior to the contract that uses a voucher system.

2.5. Optimal Allocation
The status quo allocation rule that the government uses in the indigent defense system is
the uniform random allocation rule, i.e., Λu = λu (I)

∀I.

In this section, first, for any set of hired attorneys I, we characterize the optimal allocation.
Second, for a fixed set of hired attorneys I, we specify the conditions on reservation wages
of hired attorneys such that the uniform random allocation is optimal. At the end, we
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specify a set of conditions on reservation wages of attorneys 1, ..., N and the cost function
such that the status quo contract is the optimal contract.
The government wants to minimize the cost, subject to hiring N attorneys and incentivizes
them to exert high eﬀort. The government can choose a selection rule, an allocation rule,
and a wage contract. We showed that the merit-based selection rule is optimal under the
uniform random allocation rule, and we specified the optimal wage contract in Lemma 1.
In this section, we define and characterize the optimal allocation.
Given a set I, an allocation λ∗ is optimal if the cost of the government under the contract
that uses λ∗ and the optimal wage contract given λ∗ , which is specified in Lemma 1, is lower
than the cost of the government under any other contract.
Theorem 3 The following linear program identifies an optimal allocation for a given set
I:

(LP*)

miny,{ϕ(i,j)}i∈I,j∈J

y

s.t.
r(qi ) +

∑
j∈J

∑
j∈J

∑
i∈I

ϕ(i, j)c(eh , dj ) ≤ y
ϕ(i, j) = 1

∀i ∈ I,

ϕ(i, j) = 1

∀j ∈ J,

ϕ(i, j) ≥ 0

∀i ∈ I,

∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J.

Proof: See the appendix.

The solution of linear program (LP*) specifies a doubly stochastic matrix [ϕ∗ (i, j)] and
y ∗ , using the Birkhoﬀ-von Neumann decomposition algorithm, we can find the optimal
allocation λ∗ .
If the reservation wages of all hired attorneys are equal, the optimal allocation can be
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characterized easily from the solution of the linear program (LP*). Lemma 5 shows that
the uniform random allocation is optimal under this condition. Therefore, the status quo
allocation that the government uses is indeed optimal if reservation wages of all hired
attorneys are equal. On the other hand, if under the status quo contract reservation wages
of all hired attorneys are not equal, then we can improve the status quo indigent defense
system by using a diﬀerent allocation rule.
Lemma 5 For a fixed set of hired attorneys I, the uniform random allocation is the optimal
allocation if and only if r(qi ) is the same for all i ∈ I.
Proof: See the appendix.

Corollary 2 If the reservation wages of at least two hired attorneys under the status quo
contract are not equal, then there exists a superior contract that hires the same set of hired
attorneys.
Define a separable cost function as c(e, d) = c(e)−g(d). This special cost function represents
the following cost structure: The utility of an attorney is the utility from wage minus
disutility of eﬀort plus nonpecuniary utility that depends on the type of his/her match, i.e.,
u(w) + g(d) − c(e). The separable cost function represents a situation in which there is no
complementarity between case diﬃculty and eﬀort level.
For the rest of the paper, we relax the restriction to the nondiscriminatory wage contracts.
A discriminatory wage contract specifies a contingent wage for each possible assignment
of attorneys and indigents, i.e., {u1 (i, j), u2 (i, j)}i∈I,j∈J . An optimal contract is a contract that minimizes the cost of the government. Note that the government can choose
any selection rule, any allocation rule, and any discriminatory wage contract to minimize
the cost. Recall that the merit-based selection rule is optimal under the uniform random
allocation rule, and based on Lemma 5, the uniform random allocation rule is optimal if
r(qi ) = r

∀i ∈ I. Currently, the government is using nondiscriminatory wage contracts.
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There are several reasons that the government should in fact use nondiscriminatory wage
contracts. First, the government is prosecuting the defendant. At the same time, the
prosecution and attorney are involved in the plea bargaining process. Using discriminatory
contracts signals the government’s perception of the likelihood of winning or losing the case.
This signal aﬀects the plea bargaining process. Second, the right to counsel is a constitutional right. Paying diﬀerent wages for diﬀerent cases based on any criteria other than the
case type may seem as discrimination among the indigent defendants. Third, it may be
the case that the government does not have the same information as the counsel about
the diﬃculty of each case. In addition to those reasons, we identify a condition such that
nondiscriminatory wage contracts are optimal even when discriminatory wage contracts are
available. The following theorem identifies conditions on reservation wages of a subset of
available attorneys and cost function such that the status quo contract is optimal among a
very broad class of contracts, such as discriminatory wage contracts; stable, deterministic
allocation rules; random allocation rules; and any selection rule that doesn’t violate the
constitutional rights of indigent defendants.
Theorem 4 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, separable cost function, and r(qi ) = r for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, the status quo contract is the optimal contract.
Proof: See the appendix.
One can use Theorem 4 for comparison and show that Theorem 1 holds because of two
diﬀerent forces; first, institutional restrictions to nondiscriminatory wage contracts, and
second, the risk aversion of attorneys.
Corollary 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a separable cost function, and r(qi ) = r for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, even if the government can announce discriminatory wage contracts, the
status quo contract is superior to any contract that uses a positive assortative matching and
any contract that uses a stable matching.
Corollary 3 shows that without restriction to nondiscriminatory wage contracts, the status
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quo contract is superior to any contract that uses a stable matching. This result is due
to the fact that attorneys are strictly risk averse. Note that under discriminatory wage
contracts, there may exist a stable matching that is not a positive assortative matching.

2.6. Conclusion
We model the assignment of indigent defendants to attorneys as a matching with a moral
hazard component. Using this model, we show that the matching process is a part of the
contract and that changing the matching process will aﬀect the incentives of attorneys.
Specifically, accommodating defendants’ and attorneys’ preferences encourages some attorneys who are hired under status quo to either exit the indigent defense system or to put
in less eﬀort making defendants worse oﬀ. Furthermore, using a voucher system makes
defendants worse oﬀ.
We characterize an optimal allocation. Using this characterization, we show that the uniform random matching is optimal if and only if the reservation wage of all hired attorneys
is the same. Hence, if under the status quo contract at least two hired attorneys have
diﬀerent reservation wages, then there exists a superior contract. The superior contract is
the merit-based selection rule, an optimal allocation, and the optimal wage contract, all
of which we characterize in this article. Under this superior contract, the government can
hire the same set of attorneys and give them suﬃcient incentive to exert high eﬀort with a
strictly lower expenditure. Finally, we show that if the cost function is separable and the
reservation wage of all hired attorneys is the same, then the status quo indigent defense
system is using the optimal contract.
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CHAPTER 3 : Sorting and Peer Eﬀects
3.1. Introduction
We introduce a model to analyze the eﬀect of student sorting on the total eﬀort of teachers
and the average or total performance of students. Our model allows for both direct and
indirect peer eﬀects. First, consider the case of homogeneous teachers who choose eﬀort
after observing their classes’ composition. Each teacher chooses an eﬀort based on the
distribution of students’ abilities in his/her class, i.e., the teacher’s choice may depend
on the whole distribution, not just the mean of students’ abilities. The eﬀect of sorting
on the teachers’ total eﬀort choice is ambiguous. Because the teachers’ total eﬀort may
increase or decrease as a result of student sorting, the eﬀect of sorting on the average
or total performance of students is ambiguous, too. We characterize conditions on the
utility function of teachers under which the total eﬀort of teachers strictly increases or
strictly decreases by sorting. If the teachers’ marginal utility of eﬀort is supermodular
(submodular) and convex (concave) in eﬀort, then the total eﬀort of teachers increases
(decreases) as a result of sorting of students. Subsequently, in the absence of direct peer
eﬀects, if performance is convex (concave) in a teacher’s eﬀort, the total performance of
an education system increases (decreases) as a result of sorting.1 We show that this result
persists even when we allow for heterogeneous teachers.
Sorting aﬀects students’ outcomes because of peer eﬀects. There are two types of peer
eﬀects: direct and indirect. Direct peer eﬀects are the result of student-to-student spillovers
(see Sacerdote (2000), Sacerdote (2011), and Epple and Romano (2011) for a review of the
literature). Indirect peer eﬀects happen through a teacher’s eﬀort choice (see Duflo et al.
(2011) and Todd and Wolpin (2012)). Duflo et al. (2011) report that both direct and
indirect peer eﬀects exist in the data and that the data cannot be explained using only one
kind of peer eﬀects.
1
Because most of the results for one set of conditions are parallel in wording to results under the other
set of conditions, instead of stating results under each set of conditions separately, we state both results in
one statement using parentheses.
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Two types of sorting are present in an education system: within-school sorting and betweenschool sorting. Within-school sorting, or tracking, is an explicit policy that sorts students
into diﬀerent classes based on their abilities. Sorting between schools happens in diﬀerent
ways, such as: (i) Sorting between public and private schools.2 (ii) Sorting as a result of
voucher programs.3 Chakrabarti (2009) states that “There is strong and robust evidence
in favor of stratification by ability” as a result of Milwaukee Voucher Program. Hsieh and
Urquiola (2006) report that they “find evidence that the voucher program led to increased
sorting, as the ‘best’ public school students left for the private sector.” (iii) Standardized
admissions tests. MacLeod and Urquiola (2012) state that “the introduction of standardized
admissions tests will lead to stratification by ability.” (iv) Public information regarding
schools’ qualities. Hastings and Weinstein (2007) find that “providing parents with direct
information on school test scores resulted in significantly more parents choosing higherscoring schools for their children.”. (v) Diﬀerent school choice policies.4 Levin (1998)
reports that “evidence is consistent that educational choice leads to greater socioeconomic
(SES) and racial segregation of students.” We incorporate both types of sorting in our
model.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on comparative statics. That literature is focused on the monotonicity of the argmax of a maximization problem;5 however, to analyze
the eﬀect of sorting on the total performance of students, we need to understand the eﬀect
of sorting on the total eﬀort of teachers, which depends on supermodularity and submodularity of the argmax of teachers’ utility maximization problem. We find conditions under
which the argmax of a maximization problem is strictly supermodular or strictly submodular. More concretely, if the marginal utility of a teacher is supermodular (submodular) and
convex (concave) in eﬀort, then the argmax of the teacher’s maximization problem — the
optimal eﬀort of the teacher — is supermodular (submodular); therefore, the total perfor2

see Epple and Romano (1998) and Epple et al. (2002) for more details.
See Barrow and Rouse (2008).
4
See Avery and Pathak (2015) for the eﬀect of implementing school choice instead of neighborhood
assignment rule on student sorting.
5
See Topkis (1998), Milgrom and Shannon (1994), and Edlin and Shannon (1998).
3

32

mance of all teachers increases (decreases) as a result of sorting students. In the absence
of direct peer eﬀects, the only channel through which sorting changes the total/average
performance of students is through indirect peer eﬀects. Hence, if teachers are putting in
more eﬀort altogether and performance is a convex function in the teacher’s eﬀort, then the
total/average students’ performance increases. On the other hand, if teachers are putting
in less eﬀort altogether and performance is a concave function in the teacher’s eﬀort, then
the total/average students’ performance decreases. We state the results for an education
system; one can use the same tools to analyze any one-to-many matching with endogenous
eﬀort choice and evaluate the eﬀect of diﬀerent matchings. Moreover, conditions for strict
supermodularity (submodularity) of the argmax are derived for a general maximization
problem; hence, these results can be used in any maximization problem that has the same
structure.
Sorting increases inequality in students’ performances; however, if the marginal utility of
teachers is supermodular and convex in eﬀort, sorting increases the total/average performance of students. In this situation, sorting is desirable under the Utilitarian welfare
function. On the other hand, if the marginal utility of teachers is submodular and concave in eﬀort, sorting decreases the total/average performance of students and increases
inequality in students’ performances. In this situation, sorting reduces both the Utilitarian welfare function and the Rawlsian welfare function. Aﬃrmative action policies have
the opposite eﬀect of sorting, i.e., these policies reduce sorting; therefore, in this situation,
aﬃrmative action policies increase both the Utilitarian welfare function and the Rawlsian
welfare function.
The eﬀect of sorting on the total/average performance through the channel of indirect peer
eﬀects is robust, whether direct peer eﬀects exist, even when teachers are heterogeneous
in quality and utility function. Furthermore, if teachers are heterogeneous and classes are
sorted, the standard results regarding the benefit of positive assortative matching (PAM)
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versus negative assortative matching (NAM) may not hold.6 We show that even if the
performance function of classes and the utility of teachers are supermodular, the total
performance of students can be higher under negative assortative matching compared with
positive assortative matching. Moreover, inequality is lower under negative assortative
matching compared to positive assortative matching. To put it diﬀerently, the value of
the Utilitarian welfare function and the Rawlsian welfare function are higher under NAM
compared with PAM.
The eﬀectiveness of monetary incentives on teachers’ eﬀort choices is debated in the literature. There is some evidence of a positive eﬀect of monetary incentives in developing
countries (Lavy (2002)). However, in developed countries such as the U.S., the evidence suggests that monetary incentives have an insignificant eﬀect on teachers’ eﬀort choices (Fryer
(2013)). We consider the U.S. as the main application, i.e., monetary incentives don’t aﬀect
teachers’ eﬀort choices. Under a pay-per-performance system in which a teacher’s wage
depends on the performance of his/her students, sorting has an impact on the budget of the
education system and results in inequality in teachers’ salaries. Sorting increases inequality in teachers’ salaries when teachers are homogeneous and wage increases are based on
students’ performances. Sorting increases (decreases) the total payment to teachers if the
total students’ performance increases (decreases) and payment to teachers is an increasing
and a convex (concave) function of class performance. Our model can incorporate monetary incentives, too. We consider a general utility function that can incorporate monetary
incentives; hence, we can analyze the eﬀect of sorting under diﬀerent monetary incentive
systems.
In section 3.2, we set up the model and develop the required mathematical tool to handle
the student sorting problem. In section 3.3, we analyze the eﬀect of student sorting on the
total eﬀort of teachers by finding conditions on the utility function of teachers such that
the argmax of their utility maximization problem is supermodular (submodular). Subse6

See Tincani (2014).
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quently in section 3.4, we show how sorting aﬀects students’ outcomes under three settings:
(1) homogeneous teacher with indirect peer eﬀects, (2) homogeneous teacher with direct and
indirect peer eﬀects, and (3) heterogeneous teacher with direct and indirect peer eﬀects.

3.2. Model
Let T be a finite set of homogeneous teachers and I a finite set of students, where |I| = n|T |.
A student i ∈ I has a type θi ∈ R+ . The type can represent a student’s ability, the prior
year’s test score, parents’ education/income, or any other characteristic that aﬀects the
students’ performance. We interpret type as ability.
A matching is an assignment of students to teachers, denoted by µ : T → I, such that
|µ(t)| = n, where n is the size of the class. Each student is assigned to only one teacher,
i.e., µ−1 (i) is a function. We denote a class by the profile of types θ ∈ Rn+ assigned to it.
We denote the class assigned to teacher t by θt = (θi )i∈µ(t) .
There is a measure of performance for each student i ∈ µ(t), denoted by p(et , θi , θt ). We
interpret a student’s performance as his/her end-of-year test score. There is an aggregate
measure of performance for each class t, denoted by p(et , θt ). We consider the aggregate
measure of performance for each class as the average performances of students in that class.
Teacher t ∈ T chooses an eﬀort et ∈ [0, 1]. Each teacher gets a payment — wage plus
bonus — based on the aggregate performance of the class, denoted by w(p(et , θt )).7 Each
teacher t has a utility function f (et , θt ). The utility function is the same for all teachers.8
f (et , θt ) represents the induced utility of a teacher; the utility of a teacher may depend on
the performance of his/her class, his/her wage, and the amount of eﬀort he/she exerts.9 We
assume that the wage structure is fixed; hence, if the utility of a teacher depends on the
7

Wage can be a constant function.
We relax this assumption in section 3.4.3.
9
For example, the utility function of a teacher can be the non pecuniary utility that he/she gets from
his/her class’s performance minus the cost of eﬀort, i.e., f (e, θ) = u(p(e, θ)) − c(e). The cost of eﬀort may
depend on eﬀort and the class composition, i.e., f (e, θ) = u(p(e, θ))−c(e, θ). The utility function of a teacher
may include the utility he/she gets from wages or bonuses plus the non pecuniary utility that he/she gets
from his/her class’s performance minus the cost of eﬀort, i.e., f (e, θ) = u(p(e, θ)) + v(w(p(e, θ))) − c(e).
8
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wage, then f (e, θ) is the induced utility function for a fixed wage structure. The marginal
utility of eﬀort at e = 1 is strictly negative for any class θ. The marginal utility of eﬀort at
e = 0 is strictly positive for any class θ.
We assume that a teacher’s utility function and performance of his/her class are symmetric
functions in students’ type, i.e., any permutation of a class θ generates the same performance
and utility for a teacher: if θ′ is a permutation of θ, then:
f (e, θ) = f (e, θ′ ), p(e, θi , θ) = p(e, θi , θ′ ), and p(e, θ) = p(e, θ′ ).

We assume a teacher’s utility function and the performance of his/her class are three times
continuously diﬀerentiable, i.e., f (e, θ), p(e, θ) ∈ C 3 .
First, we define sorting of two classes, and then we show the mathematical relationship
between sorting and the coordinate-wise maximum and minimum of two classes. We order
all the students in the two classes by their types, and then we put the top half of students
in one class and bottom half in the other class. This process is called sorting.10
One-step sorting of two classes is defined as the coordinate-wise maximum and minimum
of two classes:
∀θ, θ† : θ′ = θ ∨ θ† , θ′′ = θ ∧ θ† ,
where for any two vectors θ = (θ1 , ..., θn ), θ† = (θ1† , ..., θn† ):
θ ∨ θ† = (max(θ1 , θ1† ), ..., max(θn , θn† )), θ ∧ θ† = (min(θ1 , θ1† ), ..., min(θn , θn† )).

Lemma 6 There exists a reordering of two classes such that sorting is achieved by one-step
sorting.
10

This process is called sorting only if the two new classes have diﬀerent student compositions than they
did before sorting.
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Proof: In the appendix.
For any class θ, define θ̃ as the reordering of the vector θ in descending order, i.e., the
permutation of the class in which the first element is the greatest type in the class, the
second element is the second greatest type in the class, and so on: θ̃ = (θ̃1 , . . . , θ̃n ) such
that θ̃i ≥ θ̃i+1

∀i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Given this reordering of the two classes θ1 , θ2 , define a

partial ordering of two classes ≽∗ as the vector ordering in Rn :
θ1 ≽∗ θ2 ⇔ θ̃i1 ≥ θ̃i2

∀i = 1, . . . , n,

(3.1)

we call θ1 a better class than θ2 . Note that after sorting of two classes θ, θ† , the sorted
classes θ′ , θ′′ , have the following property:
θ ≽∗ θ′ , θ† ≽∗ θ′ , θ′′ ≽∗ θ, θ′′ ≽∗ θ† .
We call θ′ the lower track and θ′′ the higher track. Observe that the higher track is a better
class than the lower track.
These two classes can be in one school or in two diﬀerent schools. The former represents
within-school sorting; The latter represents between-school sorting. In between-school sorting, every class in one school is a better class than any class in the other school (based
on the partial order ≽∗ defined in (3.1)). However, we may be unable to order two classes
in the same school (based on the partial order ≽∗ ) after between-school sorting. All the
following results hold for both between-school sorting and within-school sorting.
A function h : Rn → R is supermodular if it is pairwise supermodular in any of its two
arguments, i.e., the cross-partial derivatives in any of its two arguments are positive.11
For example, p(e, θ) is supermodular if peθi (e, θ) ≥ 0, pθi θj (e, θ) ≥ 0

∀i, j ∈ I, ∀e, ∀θ.

If the performance function is supermodular then two types of complementarities exist:
complementarity between eﬀort of the teacher and a student’s ability and complementarity
11

See Topkis (1998).
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between students’ abilities. If cross-partials are strictly positive, then the function is strictly
supermodular. A function is modular if the cross-partial derivatives in any of its two
arguments are zero. For example, p(e, θ) is modular if peθi (e, θ) = 0, pθi θj (e, θ) = 0,
[0, 1]

∀e ∈

∀i, j, θi ∈ R+ , θj ∈ R+ . A function is submodular if it is pairwise submodular in

any of its two arguments, i.e., the cross-partial derivatives in any of its two arguments
are negative. For example, p(e, θ) is submodular if peθi (e, θ) ≤ 0, pθi θj (e, θ) ≤ 0 ∀i, j ∈
I, ∀e, ∀θ. If cross-partials are strictly negative, then the function is strictly submodular.

3.3. Characterizing Teachers’ Optimal Eﬀorts
In this section, we characterize the conditions under which the argmax of a maximization
problem is strictly supermodular or strictly submodular.12 Furthermore, these conditions
determine the eﬀect of sorting on the total eﬀort of teachers. Each teacher maximizes a
utility function; the argmax of a teacher’s maximization problem is his/her optimal effort, which is unique under the following assumption (Assumption 1). We show that if the
marginal utility of eﬀort is supermodular and convex in eﬀort, then the argmax is supermodular. Subsequently, we show that sorting increases the total eﬀort of teachers in this
case. Similarly, we show that if the marginal utility of eﬀort is submodular and concave in
eﬀort, then the argmax is submodular. We conclude that sorting decreases the total eﬀort
of teachers in this case.
Assumption 1
i) A teacher’s utility function is pairwise supermodular in eﬀort and each student’s type,
i.e., feθi (e, θ) ≥ 0

∀i, e ∈ [0, 1], θ ∈ Rn+ .

ii) Performance of a class is strictly increasing in the eﬀort of teacher and each student’s
type, i.e., pe (e, θ) > 0, pθi (e, θ) > 0. Performance of student i is strictly increasing
in the eﬀort of teacher and increasing in other student’s type, i.e., pe (e, θi , θ) > 0,
pθj (e, θi , θ) ≥ 0
12

∀j : µ−1 (i) = µ−1 (j).

We consider only maximization problems that have a unique argmax.
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iii) fee (e, θ) < 0, teachers’ utility function is strictly concave in eﬀort.
Assumption 1-i captures a complementarity between a teacher’s eﬀort and a student’s type
in teacher’s utility function. To put it diﬀerently, the marginal utility of eﬀort is increasing
in a student’s type. Assumption 1-ii states that the performance of a class increases as
the teacher puts in more eﬀort or as the ability of a student increases. Assumption 1-iii
ensures that a teacher’s maximization problem has a unique interior solution given by the
first-order condition, i.e., a teacher chooses an eﬀort such that the marginal utility of eﬀort
is zero.
Given Assumption 1, increasing a student’s type — having a better class — results in a
higher eﬀort by the teacher. The following lemma shows this result formally.
Lemma 7 Given Assumption 1, the optimal eﬀort of a teacher (e∗ (θ) = argmaxe∈[0,1] f (e, θ))
is increasing in any student’s type.
Proof: Increasing any student’s type in a class results in a better class: θi ≥ θi′ ∀i ⇒ θ ≽∗
θ′ . Using the Topkis theorem, we have θ ≽∗ θ′ ⇒ e∗ (θ) ≥ e∗ (θ′ ).

Consider two classes with two teachers. After sorting, the two teachers are assigned to
two new sorted classes, the higher track and the lower track. The teacher assigned to the
higher track puts in more eﬀort after sorting because the higher track is a better class
compared with both initial classes, based on the partial order defined in (3.1). Sorting
increases the eﬀort of the teacher assigned to the higher track and decreases the eﬀort of
the teacher assigned to the lower track. Hence, every student in the higher track has a
higher performance after sorting, and every student in lower track has a lower performance
after sorting. We call this an increase in inequality of students’ performances.
Proposition 1 Given Assumption 1, sorting increases inequality in students’ performances,
i.e., every student in the higher track has a higher performance after sorting, and every student in the lower track has a lower performance after sorting.
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Proof: By Lemma 7, a teacher’s eﬀort increases in the higher track. Because performance
is increasing in teacher’s eﬀort, every student in the higher track has a higher performance
after sorting. Similarly for students in the lower track, performance decreases after sorting.

Corollary 4 Under the Rawlsian welfare function, i.e., Max-Min of all students’ performances, sorting decreases welfare.
To understand the eﬀect of sorting on the average/total performance of students, first we
need to analyze another problem: What is the eﬀect of sorting on the total eﬀort of teachers?
In the following theorem, we show that if the marginal utility of eﬀort is supermodular and
convex in eﬀort, then the argmax of a teacher’s utility maximization problem — the optimal
eﬀort of a teacher — is strictly supermodular. Under this condition, sorting increases the
total eﬀort of teachers. Similarly, if the marginal utility of eﬀort is submodular and concave
in eﬀort, then the argmax of the teacher’s utility maximization problem — the optimal
eﬀort of a teacher — is strictly submodular.
Condition 1 The marginal utility of eﬀort is supermodular and convex in eﬀort:
feθi θj (e, θ) ≥ 0, feeθi (e, θ) ≥ 0, feee (e, θ) ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ [0, 1], i, j, θi ∈ R+ , θj ∈ R+ ,

with at least one strict inequality.
Condition 2 The marginal utility of eﬀort is submodular and concave in eﬀort:
feθi θj (e, θ) ≤ 0, feeθi (e, θ) ≤ 0, feee (e, θ) ≤ 0, ∀e ∈ [0, 1], i, j, θi ∈ R+ , θj ∈ R+ ,

with at least one strict inequality.
Theorem 5
1. If Condition 1 is satisfied, then the optimal eﬀort is strictly supermodular.
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Figure 1: The teacher’s marginal utility of eﬀort is convex.
2. If Condition 2 is satisfied, then the optimal eﬀort is strictly submodular.
Proof: In the appendix.
Theorem 5 holds under weaker conditions, which we characterize in the appendix.
The following thought experiment shows the eﬀect of each inequality in Condition 1 on the
teacher’s total eﬀort. Consider a teacher assigned to two identical classes. The teacher
chooses an eﬀort level such that the marginal utility of eﬀort is zero, e∗ in Figure 1, for
both classes. Hence, the total eﬀort is 2e∗ . After sorting, the teacher’s marginal utility
changes in both classes. More concretely, the teacher’s marginal utility in the higher track
shifts upward and in the lower track shifts downward at e∗ . Suppose these two shifts are
equal, i.e., s1 = s2 in Figure 1. Because the marginal utility of eﬀort is convex, recall that
feee (e, θ) ≥ 0, the increase in the teacher’s optimal eﬀort in the higher track is more than
the decrease in the teacher’s optimal eﬀort in the lower track, i.e., eh − e∗ ≥ e∗ − el in Figure
1, with strict inequality if the marginal utility of eﬀort is strictly convex.
On top of that, feθi θj (e, θ) ≥ 0 ensures that the marginal utility of eﬀort is supermodular
in students’ type. Therefore, the upward shift in the marginal utility function in the higher
track is greater than or equal to the downward shift in the teacher’s marginal utility of
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Figure 2: The teacher’s marginal utility of eﬀort is pairwise supermodular in students’ type.
eﬀort in the lower track, s1 ≥ s2 in Figure 2. This implies that eh − e∗ ≥ e∗ − el in Figure
2, with strict inequality if the marginal utility of eﬀort is strictly supermodular.
feeθi (e, θ) ≥ 0 ensures that the slope of the marginal utility of eﬀort for the teacher in the
higher track is greater than or equal to the slope of the marginal utility of eﬀort for the
teacher in the lower track. To put it diﬀerently, in Figure 3, the marginal utility of eﬀort
for the higher track is flatter than the marginal utility of eﬀort before sorting, which is
flatter than the marginal utility of eﬀort for the lower track. Hence, the teacher’s optimal
eﬀort in the lower track, e∗l , is to the right of el , and the teacher’s optimal eﬀort in the
higher track, e∗h , is to the right of eh . Therefore, e∗h − e∗ ≥ e∗ − e∗l with strict inequality
if feeθi (e, θ) ≥ 0 holds with strict inequality. To conclude, each of the three inequalities in
Condition 1 ensure that the total eﬀort of the teacher increases after sorting. We state the
result for any initial class composition in the following proposition.
Proposition 2
1. Given Condition 1, sorting strictly increases the total eﬀort of teachers.
2. Given Condition 2, sorting strictly decreases the total eﬀort of teachers.
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Figure 3: The teacher’s marginal utility of eﬀort is pairwise supermodular in the teacher’s
eﬀort and student’s type.
Proof:
1. By Lemma 6, sorting is achieved by one-step sorting. By Theorem 5, the total eﬀort
strictly increases if a class composition changes. Hence, sorting strictly increases the
total eﬀort of teachers.
2. By Lemma 6, sorting is achieved by one-step sorting. By Theorem 5, the total eﬀort
strictly decreases if a class composition changes. Hence, sorting strictly decreases the
total eﬀort of teachers.

The eﬀect of sorting on the total performance of students, under standard assumptions used
in the literature, is ambiguous.
Example 1 (Value-added system)

This example is inspired by the value-added measure
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used in Koedel et al. (2015). Suppose p(e, θi , θ) = eθi and


1∑
P (e, θ) =
p(e, θi , θ) − p′ (θi ) ,
n
i∈µ(t)

where p′ (θi ) is student i’s last year’s test score. This performance function measures the
average of a teacher’s contribution to the increase in the students’ scores from their scores
from last year. Consider the following utility function:
f (e, θ) = u(P (e, θ)) − c(e).
Suppose θi > 1 and e ∈ [ϵ, 1] for some 0 < ϵ < 1, u′ (.) > 0, u′′ (.) < 0, c′ (.) > 0, c′′ (.) ≥ 0,
and c′′′ (.) ≥ 0.
If u′′′ (.) ≤ 0, then sorting decreases the total performance of students; however, if u′′′ (.) ≥
( ) ′′′
max{−u′′ (.) 2n
e , c (.)}, then sorting increases the total performance of students. (The
proof is in the appendix.)

3.4. Impact of Sorting on Students’ Performances
In this section, we characterize the eﬀect of sorting on the average of students’ performances
under three diﬀerent settings:

(1) only indirect peer eﬀects exist;13 (2) both direct and

indirect peer eﬀects exist; and (3) teachers are heterogeneous in quality and utility function,
and both direct and indirect peer eﬀects exist.
First, we consider a setting with homogeneous teachers and without direct peer eﬀects. The
only impact of sorting on students’ performances is through indirect peer eﬀects. Using the
characterization of the total eﬀort of teachers after sorting, we can characterize the eﬀect of
sorting on the average of students’ performances. If teachers are putting in more (less) eﬀort
in total and the performance function is convex (concave) in eﬀort, then the total/average
13

We assume students benefit from high achieving peers in all sections; however, we consider direct peer
eﬀects as the direct peer eﬀects that have diﬀerent eﬀects on students with diﬀerent abilities. Stated
diﬀerently, if the performance is a modular function in students’ type, then there is no direct peer eﬀects.
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students’ performance increases (decreases). This setting allows us to isolate the eﬀect of
teachers’ eﬀort and the role of the curvature of the teachers’ marginal utility function in
answering our main question: Does sorting increase or decrease the average performances
of students? Is sorting a desirable outcome based on the utilitarian welfare criterion?
Second, we consider a setting with both direct and indirect peer eﬀects with homogeneous
teachers. Duflo et al. (2011) report that both direct and indirect peer eﬀects exist in the
data and that excluding either is inconsistent with their data. Sorting has two eﬀects on
the average of students’ performances. If both eﬀects go in the same direction then we
can determine whether sorting increases or decreases the average of students’ performances.
However, if these two eﬀects go in opposite directions, then the eﬀect of sorting depends on
the magnitude of each eﬀect; we provide a general method to evaluate the eﬀect of sorting
on average students’ performances in this case.
Third, we consider a general environment in which teachers have diﬀerent qualities and
utility functions, and both direct and indirect peer eﬀects exist. We show that — by
extending Assumption 1, Condition 1, and Condition 2 to include teachers’ type — the
previous results are robust. Furthermore, if classes are ordered by the partial ordering ≻∗
defined in (3.1), we can analyze the welfare implications of positive assortative matching
(PAM) of teachers and classes compared with negative assortative matching (NAM) of
teachers and classes. The curvature of the marginal utility of eﬀort of teachers has an
important impact on this welfare comparison. There are simple examples in which the
usual results about the benefits of PAM compared with NAM don’t hold. More precisely,
in these examples, switching from PAM to NAM decreases the inequality and increases the
average performances of students, i.e., increases both the utilitarian welfare function and
the Rawlsian welfare function.

45

3.4.1. Indirect Peer Eﬀects
Consider an environment in which all teachers have the same quality and utility function.
Suppose there is no direct peer eﬀect.14 What is the eﬀect of sorting on the total students’
performance in this environment? Can we increase the average performance of students
by changing the composition of the classes? In other words, which matching of students
to classes maximizes the total performance of students? In this subsection,we show that
the answers to these questions depend on the curvature of the marginal utility of eﬀort of
teachers. More concretely, if Condition 1 is satisfied and performance is convex in eﬀort,
sorting increases the total performance of students, i.e., sorting is a desirable outcome based
on the utilitarian criterion. On the other hand, if Condition 2 is satisfied and performance
is concave in eﬀort, sorting is the least desirable matching of students to classes under both
the utilitarian and the Rawlsian criteria.
Suppose there is no direct peer eﬀect, i.e., peθi (e, θ) = 0, pθi θj (e, θ) = 0 ∀e ∈ [0, 1], i, j, θi ∈
R+ , θj ∈ R+ . Then, the only eﬀect of sorting on students’ performances is through indirect
peer eﬀects. The direction of indirect peer eﬀects depends on whether Condition 1 is satisfied
and performance is convex in eﬀort or Condition 2 is satisfied and performance is concave
in eﬀort. Under the former, teachers put in more eﬀort in total, and the composition of
classes for a fixed level eﬀort doesn’t aﬀect the total performance of these classes; therefore,
sorting increases the total performance. Under the latter, teachers put in less eﬀort in total;
hence, sorting decreases total performance.
Theorem 6
1. If Condition 1 holds and performance is modular and convex in eﬀort, sorting strictly
increases the total performance of students.
2. If Condition 2 holds and performance is modular and concave in eﬀort, sorting strictly
decreases the total performance of students.
14

See Foster (2006).
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Proof: In the appendix.
The proof specifies a general method for analyzing other situations as well; for example,
when Condition 1 is satisfied but performance is concave in eﬀort. Simply put, if equation
(A.10) defined in the appendix is positive (negative), then sorting increases (decreases) the
total performance.
Note that even when there is no direct peer eﬀect and the total eﬀort of teachers increases,
the total performance may increase or decrease by sorting. For example, consider two
teachers who exert the same level of eﬀort for two identical classes; one teacher increases
his/her eﬀort by an amount equal to the amount by which the other teacher decreases his/her
eﬀort. The total performance of these two classes (strictly) increases if the performance
function is (strictly) convex and (strictly) decreases if the performance function is (strictly)
concave.
If Condition 1 holds and performance is modular and convex in eﬀort, the eﬀect of sorting
depends on the welfare function that we use, i.e., based on diﬀerent welfare objectives sorting
maybe desirable or undesirable. If Condition 2 holds and performance is modular and
convex in eﬀort, sorting results in the worst classes’ compositions among all other classes’
compositions. Therefore, a policymaker needs to consider the curvature of a teacher’s
marginal utility of eﬀort in order to make a decision that increases or decreases the sorting
of students.
Corollary 5
1. If condition 1 holds and performance is modular and convex in eﬀort, sorting improves
the utilitarian welfare function but decreases the Rawlsian welfare function.
2. If condition 2 holds and performance is modular and concave in eﬀort, sorting decreases both the utilitarian welfare function and the Rawlsian welfare function.
Because sorting changes the performance of classes, under a pay-per-performance system,
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sorting has an eﬀect on the total payment to teachers — budget of an education system —
and on inequality in payments to teachers. For example, under the value-added system in
the U.S. education system, tracking increases teachers’ income inequality; however, it may
increase or decrease the average payment to teachers. The following corollary states these
eﬀects formally.
Corollary 6
1. If Condition 1 holds, performance is modular and convex in eﬀort, and payment
to teachers is an increasing and convex function of class performance, then sorting
strictly increases the total payment to teachers.
2. If Condition 2 holds, performance is modular and concave in eﬀort, and payment
to teachers is an increasing and concave function of class performance, then sorting
strictly decreases the total payment to teachers.
3. If payment to teachers is an increasing function of class performance, then sorting
strictly increases inequality in teachers’ payments.
3.4.2. Direct and Indirect Peer Eﬀects
Suppose both direct and indirect peer eﬀects are present. Direct and indirect peer eﬀects
may aﬀect the total performances of students after sorting in the same direction or in
opposite directions. If both direct and indirect peer eﬀects increases (decrease) the total
performances of students, then the eﬀect of sorting is clear, which we state in the following
theorem. On the other hand, if they have the opposite eﬀect on the total performances of
students, then the eﬀect of sorting on the total performance depends on the magnitude of
direct versus indirect peer eﬀects. We provide a general method to evaluate the eﬀect of
sorting on the total performances of students when the direct and indirect peer eﬀects have
the opposite eﬀect on the total performances of students.
Theorem 7

48

1. If Condition 1 holds and performance is increasing, supermodular, and convex in
eﬀort, sorting strictly increases the total performance of students.
2. If Condition 2 holds and performance is increasing, submodular, and concave in eﬀort,
sorting strictly decreases the total performance of students.
Proof: In the appendix.
Note that Proposition 1 and Corollary 4 hold in this subsection. Hence, sorting increases
inequality in students’ performance.
Corollary 7
1. If Condition 1 holds and performance is increasing, supermodular, and convex in
eﬀort, sorting improves the utilitarian welfare but decreases the Rawlsian welfare.
2. If Condition 2 holds and performance is increasing, submodular, and concave in eﬀort,
sorting decreases both the utilitarian welfare and the Rawlsian welfare.
Consider a situation in which sorting increases the total performances of students because
of direct peer eﬀects but decreases the total performances of students because of indirect
peer eﬀects. The eﬀect of sorting on the total performance depends on the magnitude of
these two forces. A general method for finding the eﬀect of the tradeoﬀ between direct and
indirect peer eﬀects for any performance function p(e, θ) and any utility function f (e, θ) is:
Step 1: Use equation (A.11) in the appendix to find the sign of the function Ψ(e, θ), which
is defined in equation (A.11) in the appendix.
Step 2: If Ψ(e, θ) is positive everywhere, then sorting increases the total performance; if
Ψ(e, θ) is negative everywhere, then sorting decreases the total performance (proof in the
appendix).
Step 3: If the sign of Ψ(e, θ) is unclear for all eﬀort levels and class compositions, we can
find the sign of Ψ(e, θ) for a given level of eﬀort and a given class composition. If Ψ(e, θ)
is positive, then sorting increases the total performance at the given eﬀort level and class
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composition; if Ψ(e, θ) is negative, then sorting decreases the total performance at the given
eﬀort level and class composition.
In Theorems 6 and 7, we used Assumption 1; specifically, we used the assumption that
pθi ≥ 0 and feθi > 0. Note that we can define the order on θi such that pθi ≥ 0 holds.
To put it diﬀerently, assumption of pθi ≥ 0 is without loss of generality; however, the
assumption that both pθi and feθi are strictly positive is not without loss of generality.
One can relax this assumption: suppose teachers prefer low-ability students, i.e., suppose
feθi < 0. Then the optimal eﬀort of a teacher is decreasing in a student’s type. Moreover,
we can use the general method, i.e., finding the sign of Ψ(e, θ), to determine the eﬀect of
sorting on the total performance of students in this situation.
Using the results from Theorem 7, we can specify the eﬀect of sorting on the teachers’
payment when both direct and indirect peer eﬀects exist.
Corollary 8
1. If Condition 1 holds, performance is increasing and supermodular, and payment to
teachers is an increasing and convex function of class performance, then sorting
strictly increases the total payment to teachers.
2. If Condition 2 holds, performance is increasing and submodular, and payment to teachers is an increasing and concave function of class performance, then sorting strictly
decreases the total payment to teachers.
3. If payment to teachers is an increasing function of class performance, then sorting
strictly increases inequality in teachers’ payments.
3.4.3. Heterogeneous Teachers and Direct and Indirect Peer Eﬀects
Suppose each teacher has a quality — teacher’s type — qt ∈ R+ that enters the performance
function and teachers’ utility function, i.e., teachers’ utility function is f (e, q, θ) and the
performance of a class is p(e, q, θ). We extend Assumption 1 and Conditions 1 and 2 to
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include the teachers’ type as well.
Assumption 2 A teacher’s utility function is pairwise supermodular in eﬀort and the
teacher’s type, i.e., feq (e, q, θ) ≥ 0

∀e ∈ [0, 1], q ∈ R+ , θ ∈ Rn+ .

Condition 3 The marginal utility of eﬀort is supermodular and convex in eﬀort, i.e.,
feqθi ≥ 0, feeq ≥ 0, feθi θj ≥ 0, feeθi ≥ 0, feee ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ [0, 1], ∀θ ∈ Rn+ , ∀q ∈ R+ ,

with at least one strict inequality.
Condition 4 The marginal utility of eﬀort is submodular and concave in eﬀort, i.e.,
feqθi ≤ 0, feeq ≤ 0, feθi θj ≤ 0, feeθi ≤ 0, feee ≤ 0, ∀e ∈ [0, 1], ∀θ ∈ Rn+ , ∀q ∈ R+ ,

with at least one strict inequality.
We maintain the assumption of anonymity for students of a class, i.e., teachers’ utility
functions and the performance of a class are symmetric functions in students’ types. The
one-step sorting is defined as before with the assignment of the higher-quality teacher to
the upper track. Sorting is defined as: Order all the students in the two classes by their
types, then put the top half of the students in one class with the teacher who has the higher
quality and put the bottom half in the other class with the teacher who has the lower
type. If the two new classes have diﬀerent student and teacher compositions as did the two
classes before sorting, then this process is called sorting. After sorting of two classes, we
can order the students of these classes by the binary relation ≻∗ defined in (3.1). Define
student sorting with positive assortative matching(PAM) as the sorting of students of two
classes and assigning the higher-quality teacher to the higher-track class and the lowertype teacher to the lower-track class. Sorting is equivalent to student sorting with PAM.
Similarly, define student sorting with negative assortative matching(NAM) as the sorting of
students of two classes and assigning the lower-quality teacher to the higher-track class and
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the higher-quality teacher to the lower-track class.
The following theorem states the parallel result of Theorem 6 when teachers are heterogeneous. We drive the result parallel to Proposition 2 — the eﬀect of sorting on the total
teachers’ eﬀort — in the appendix.
Theorem 8 Given Assumptions 1 and 2:
1. If Condition 3 holds and performance is supermodular and convex, sorting of two
classes increases the total performance.
2. If Condition 4 holds and performance is submodular and concave, sorting of two classes
decreases the total performance.
Proof: In the appendix.
As we stated in Corollary 6, under a pay-per-performance system — such as the valueadded system in the U.S. — sorting changes the inequality in teachers’ payment and the
total payment to teachers.
Corollary 9 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
1. If Condition 3 holds, performance is supermodular and convex, and payment to teachers is an increasing and convex function of class performance, then sorting strictly
increases the total payment to teachers.
2. If Condition 4 holds, performance is submodular and concave, and payment to teachers is an increasing and concave function of class performance, then sorting strictly
decreases the total payment to teachers.
3. If payment to teachers is an increasing function of class performance, then sorting
strictly increases inequality in teachers’ payments.
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Changing the matching from PAM to NAM when students are sorted — or classes are
ordered by the binary relationship ≻∗ defined in (3.1) — has the opposite eﬀect of sorting.
The following theorem shows one implication of such a change in the matching of classes
and teachers. Note that the standard assumption on supermodularity or submodularity
of the performance function is insuﬃcient for analyzing the advantage or disadvantage of
PAM versus NAM.
Theorem 9 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 and Condition 4 are satisfied and performance
is submodular and concave:
1. The total performance under student sorting with NAM is higher than student sorting
with PAM.
2. Inequality in students’ performance under student sorting with NAM is lower than
student sorting with PAM.
Proof: In the appendix.
Corollary 10 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 and Condition 4 are satisfied and performance is submodular and concave:
1. The total payment to teachers under student sorting with NAM is higher than student
sorting with PAM.
2. Inequality in teachers’ payment under student sorting with NAM is lower than student
sorting with PAM.
Remark 1 Aﬃrmative Action:
Let I be a set of students and each student belongs to either the minority group or the
majority group. These students are assigned to two classes θ1 , θ2 , such that θ1 ≻∗ θ2 .
Suppose the percentage of minority students in class θ1 in less than ϕ and the percentage of
minority students in class θ2 is more than ϕ.
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Aﬃrmative action policies such as implementing a quota, i.e., assigning at least ϕ percent
of seats to minority students in each class, have the opposite eﬀect of sorting. Denote the
two classes after implementing quotas by θa1 ,θa2 . The following relation between these classes
hold: θ1 ≻∗ θa1 , θ2 ≻∗ θa1 , θa2 ≻∗ θ2 , and θa2 ≻∗ θ1 . Aﬃrmative action policies have
the opposite eﬀect of sorting on the total/average eﬀort of teachers and the total/average
performance of students in Proposition 2 and Theorems 6, 7, and 8.

3.5. Conclusion
We model an education system in which teachers choose their eﬀort level based on the
whole distribution of students, not only the mean of students’ abilities. Furthermore, in our
model both direct and indirect peer eﬀects exist. The model incorporates both betweenschool sorting and within-school sorting, i.e., tracking.
We show that the standard assumptions in the literature are insuﬃcient to understand the
eﬀect of sorting on the total eﬀort of teachers and the total performance of students. We
show that the change in the total performance of students after sorting depends on teachers’
utility function. Even in the absence of direct peer eﬀects, when teachers are homogeneous,
sorting has an eﬀect on the total eﬀort of teachers and the total performance of students
that depends on the curvature of teachers’ marginal utility of eﬀort.
We characterize conditions on the utility function of a teacher under which the optimal
eﬀort of a teacher is strictly supermodular. Under these conditions, sorting increases the
total eﬀort of teachers and the total performance of students, even though sorting increases
inequality in students’ performances. Therefore, under these conditions, how one evaluates
the eﬀect of sorting on students’ performances depends on the welfare criteria chosen, i.e.,
under the Utilitarian criterion, sorting increases welfare; however, under the Rawlsian criterion, sorting decreases welfare. Similarly, we characterize conditions on the utility function
of a teacher under which the optimal eﬀort of a teacher is strictly submodular. Under these
conditions, under both welfare criteria, any assignment of students to teachers is strictly
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preferred to sorting.
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CHAPTER 4 : Total Output as the Measure of Welfare in a Labor Market
4.1. Introduction
A classic question in economics is what are the welfare consequences of diﬀerent allocations
of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous firms. The total surplus of all firms and all workers, welfare, is unobservable because the cost of providing eﬀective labor to the workers is
unobservable. Even though many economists have noted that the total output (GDP) is a
flawed measure of economic welfare,1 many researchers in the empirical literature, especially
in the macro search literature, use GDP instead of the total surplus as a proxy for welfare.
Hsieh et al. (2013) use aggregate output per worker to measure the macroeconomic consequences of the convergence in the occupational distribution between white men, women,
and blacks, which captures the change in the allocation of talent to occupations.2 Hagedorn
et al. (2012) use output as the objective of the optimal assignment of workers to firms under
diﬀerent assumptions about the production function of a matched worker-firm pair. Lise
et al. (2015a) develop an empirical search-matching model to estimate the potential gain
from optimal regulation. They define optimal policy as the policy that maximizes total
output and home production, i.e., GDP.
Within our model, the total output measures the welfare, the total surplus of workers and
firms, only if the eﬀective labor supplied by workers does not depend on the firm they are
matched with. If labor is a complement to or a substitute for a firm’s technology, then the
marginal product of labor is diﬀerent when a worker is matched with a more productive firm;
therefore, a worker’s labor choice is diﬀerent when he/she matches with a more productive
firm. The assumption of fixed hours of labor supply may seem reasonable in a market for
unskilled labor; however, in a market for skilled labor, such as the market for CEOs,3 it
1

Jones and Klenow (2010) states “Leisure, inequality, mortality, morbidity, crime, and the natural environment are just some of the major factors aﬀecting living standards within a country that are incorporated
imperfectly, if at all, in GDP.”
2
Firms in our model are the same as occupations.
3
See Scheuer and Werning (2015); in their model, a CEO works more at a larger firm because of the
complementarity between the CEO’s eﬀective labor and the firm’s size.
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seems less plausible.
We show that when one considers the endogenous labor choice of workers, relaxing the
assumption of fixed hours of labor supply,4 the total output can be a misleading measure of
welfare: change in the total output may underestimate or overestimate an increase in the
total surplus; moreover, the total output may decrease when the total surplus increases. We
characterize two sets of suﬃcient conditions on the production function and cost function
for which the total output and welfare move in the same direction. Under the first set of
conditions, if the total surplus increases, the total output increases more than the total
surplus. Stated diﬀerently, the total output overestimates the eﬃciency gains. Under the
second set of conditions, if the total surplus increases, the total output increases but the
increase is less than the increase in the total surplus. In other words, the total output
underestimates the eﬃciency gains. We identify a third set of conditions under which the
total output decreases if the total surplus increases; i.e., if one uses the total output to
measure the welfare eﬀect of a policy, then the conclusion is wrong. To our knowledge,
this is the first study to model this problem formally, we specify when the total output is a
misleading measure of eﬃciency and in which direction. Put diﬀerently, we specify whether
the bias is upward or downward and when the total output changes in the opposite direction
of welfare.
We develop a model in which firms post personalized wage schedules before matching with
workers, and after the matching stage, workers choose an amount of labor. An equilibrium
outcome in this setting is a collection of wages, the induced matching, and the induced eﬀort
levels which we formally define in section 4.2.1. Our model is closely related to Bulow and
Levin (2006) and Jungbauer (2016) with an endogenous eﬀort choice after the matching.
There is heterogeneity in both sides of the market. We assume that the marginal product of
labor depends on both the firm’s technology and the worker’s ability. The worker’s ability
and the firm’s technology are complements; however, labor can be a complement to or a
4

Lise et al. (2015b) report that they “find mixed evidence in support of the assumption of fixed hours of
labor supply.”
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substitute for the ability of the worker or technology of the firm. We assume that labor
is observable and contractible. We show that, in both cases, positive assortative matching
(PAM) is the most eﬃcient matching and is the only matching in any contracting equilibrium. However, PAM may minimize or maximize the total output. Furthermore, PAM,
compared with other matchings, may have higher or lower total labor and total leisure.5 We
conclude that the total output does not always measure the eﬃciency of the labor market
when the amount of labor depends on the matching. More concretely, when eﬃciency increases, the total output may decrease. We characterize a set of suﬃcient conditions on the
production function and cost function under which the total output increases if eﬃciency
increases.
The model is consistent with some empirical finding that may seem in contradiction with
the assumption that there is a complementarity between the worker’s ability and the firm’s
technology. For example, our results are consistent with better workers working fewer hours
compared with other workers. More concretely, if the production function is submodular
in labor and worker’s ability, submodular in labor and firm’s technology, and supermodular
in worker’s ability and firm’s technology, better workers match with better firms and they
work less. In other words, in any equilibrium, the most able worker is matched with the firm
with the highest technology and the most able worker works less than all other workers. In
contrast, the least able worker works more than all other workers. Hagedorn et al. (2012)’s
findings is another example. They use a large German matched employer-employee data
set to estimate the production function. They solve for the optimal assignment of workers
and firms to maximize output in their data set. Subsequently, they show that this output
is higher than the output under PAM.6 Hence, they state that the production function
is not globally supermodular. We show that, even if the production function is globally
supermodular in workers’ type and firms’ type, the output maximizing assignment can be
5

Labor and leisure move in opposite directions. A policy that increases labor, decreases leisure.
“Solving the optimal output maximizing assignment problem we find that optimally assigning individual
workers to individual firms increases output only by 4.47%. In contrast, reassigning workers to the main
diagonal, as would be optimal given the typical assumption of a globally supermodular production function
would imply a 1.43% decline in output.”
6
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diﬀerent from the eﬃcient assignment of workers to firms.
In Section 4.2, we formally describe the model and define the appropriate notion of equilibrium for this model. In Section 4.3, we define a benchmark contract between a given worker
and a firm in this setting and the induced eﬀort choice under this contract; then, we show
that the social planner chooses this eﬀort level for any matched worker-firm pair. Moreover, the social planner chooses positive assortative matching as the eﬃcient matching. In
Section 4.4, we show that an equilibrium exists, and the equilibrium outcome is unique and
eﬃcient. In Section 4.5, we provide an example in which the production function is strictly
supermodular in firm’s technology and worker’s ability. However, the total output is the
same under any matching. In this example, the total surplus is strictly higher under PAM
than under any other matching. The main results are presented in Section 4.5, where we
show that the eﬃciency always increases when all frictions in a labor market are eliminated;
however, the increase or decrease in the total output depends on the sign and magnitude
of the third derivative of the production function.

4.2. Model
There is a finite set of workers I and a finite set of firms J, where |I| = |J|. Worker
i ∈ I has an ability, the worker’s type; which with a slight abuse of notation, we denote
worker i’s ability by i. If i < i′ , then worker i has a lower ability than worker i′ . Firm
j ∈ J has a technology, the firm’s type, which we denote by j. If j < j ′ , then firm j has
a lower level of technology than firm j ′ . The types of all firms and workers are common
knowledge. A matching is a one-to-one mapping µ : I → J that assigns each worker to a
firm. Worker i chooses an eﬀort e ∈ [0, 1] after assignment to a firm. We use the words
eﬀort and labor interchangeably. Eﬀort is observable and contactable. Worker i’s utility
from being matched to firm j and exerting eﬀort e is u(i, j, e) = w(i, j, e) − c(e), where
w(i, j, e) is the wage worker i gets if he/she matches with firm j and exerts eﬀort e and
c(e) is the cost of exerting eﬀort e. The reservation wage is zero for all workers. Firm j’s
production (output) when matched with worker i who exerts eﬀort e, is v(i, j, e); hence,
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firm j’s profit is π(i, j, e) = v(i, j, e) − w(i, j, e).
The market unfolds in four stages:
(i) Firms announce personalized wage schedules: {w(i, j, e)}e∈[0,1],i∈I,j∈J .
(ii) Firms and workers match in the matching stage.
(iii) Each worker chooses a utility maximizing eﬀort level given the matching and wage
schedule.
(iv) Each worker receives a wage based on the wage schedule and eﬀort choice.
We model the matching stage as a cooperative game. For any worker-firm pair, given
the wage schedule and the anticipated worker’s eﬀort choice, the worker knows the utility
that he/she gets from the match. Moreover, given the wage schedule and the anticipated
worker’s eﬀort choice, the firm knows its profit in the match. We assume that, if a worker
is indiﬀerent between two firms, he/she will rank firms based on the firm technology; i.e.,
ties are broken in favor of the most eﬃcient match.
We derive our results under a set of standard assumptions, as we want to show that, even
under these assumptions, a change in the total output does not measure the change in the
total surplus.
Assumption 3
1. v(i, j, e) and c(e) are three times continuously diﬀerentiable.
2. c(e) is strictly increasing and convex.
3. v(i, j, e) is strictly increasing, v(i, j, e) is concave in eﬀort, and

∂ 2 (v(i,j,e)−c(e))
∂e2

< 0.

4. ∀i, j : v(i, j, 0) = c(0) = 0, ∃ϵ > 0 : v(i, j, ϵ) − c(ϵ) > 0, and v(i, j, 1) − c(1) < 0.
5. v(i, j, e) has strictly increasing diﬀerences in worker’s type i and firm’s type j; i.e.,
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vij (i, j, e) > 0.
The first four parts are mainly technical assumptions which ensure that the problem of
maximizing the surplus of a worker-firm pair over diﬀerent labor choices has an interior
solution. The last part states that there is a complementarity between a firm’s technology
and a worker’s ability in the production. All five parts of Assumption 3 are standard
assumptions.
Assumption 4
1. v(i, j, e) has increasing diﬀerences in worker’s type i and eﬀort; i.e., vie (i, j, e) ≥ 0.
2. v(i, j, e) has increasing diﬀerences in firm’s type j and eﬀort; i.e., vje (i, j, e) ≥ 0.
Assumption 5
1. v(i, j, e) has decreasing diﬀerences in worker’s type i and eﬀort; i.e., vie (i, j, e) ≤ 0.
2. v(i, j, e) has decreasing diﬀerences in firm’s type j and eﬀort; i.e., vje (i, j, e) ≤ 0.
Under Assumption 4, there is a complementarity between labor and the firm’s technology
and between labor and the worker’s ability. In contrast, under Assumption 5, labor is a
substitute for the firm’s technology and for the worker’s ability. Most of our results hold
under either of these assumptions.
4.2.1. Contracting Equilibrium
In this section, we define a contracting equilibrium and the outcome of an equilibrium. The
definition of equilibrium combines two notions of equilibria, cooperative and noncooperative,
with the requirement that they hold for all histories. This equilibrium definition is not
restricted to a frictionless market.7
Following Cole et al. (2001), we define a contracting equilibrium as wage schedules for
7

One can model a market with frictions as a set of restrictions on the set of feasible worker-firm pairs.
Infeasible pairs cannot be part of an equilibrium or block an equilibrium.
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all firms and workers (on and oﬀ the equilibrium path) {ŵ(i, j, e)}e∈[0,1],i∈I,j∈J , workers’
eﬀort choice {ê(i, j)}i∈I,j∈J , and the matching of firm and workers such that:
1. Firms maximize their profits given other firms’ and workers’ strategy.
2. Given the matching and wage schedule, each worker chooses an eﬀort that maximizes
his/her utility on and oﬀ the equilibrium path; i.e., ê(i, j) ∈ argmaxe∈[0,1] u(i, j, ŵ(i, j, e)).
3. The matching is stable. More concretely, (i) there is no worker, firm, wage schedule
between them, and an eﬀort choice such that both the worker and the firm strictly
prefer it to their current match (no blocking pair). (ii) Each worker gets at least zero
utility, and each firm makes a positive profit (individual rationality).
Note that the no blocking pair condition is an extension of the standard no blocking pair
condition (see Roth and Sotomayor (1992)). This extension of no blocking pair condition
embodies the no regret condition into the standard no blocking pair condition. We assume
that, if a worker is indiﬀerent between two or more eﬀort levels, he/she will choose the
highest eﬀort level.
This equilibrium notion combines a noncooperative notion (Nash) and a cooperative notion
(stability), with the requirement that the stability holds after all histories and workers
choose the optimal eﬀort level after all histories. Observe that each firm is best replying
to the other firms’ strategy and that the future consequences of any strategy is correctly
foreseen.
The outcome of a contracting equilibrium consists of:
(1) a matching µ̂,
(2) an eﬀort ê(i) = ê(i, µ̂(i)) for worker i,
(3) a wage ŵ(i) = w(i, µ̂(i), ê(i)) for worker i.
Therefore, given the outcome of a contracting equilibrium, we have:
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(1) a utility û(i) = ŵ(i) − c(ê(i)) for worker i,
(2) an output v̂(j) = v(µ̂−1 (j), j, ê(µ̂−1 (j))) for firm j,
(3) a profit π̂(j) = v̂(j) − ŵ(µ̂−1 (j)) for firm j,
(4) A surplus ŝ(i, j) = v̂(j) − c(ê(i)) = π̂(j) + û(i) for a matched pair (j = µ̂(i)).

4.3. Eﬃciency
In this section, we characterize the eﬃcient matching and the eﬃcient labor choice for any
matched pair by solving the social planner’s problem. We specify a benchmark contract for
a given worker-firm pair; the benchmark contract is the optimal contract from firm’s point
of view when the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to a single worker. Subsequently, we
show that the social planner selects this contract for any given worker-firm pair (Section
4.3.2). In Section 4.3.3, we characterize the eﬃcient matching. Observe that, given the
matching and eﬀort level induced by the wage contract, we can find the total surplus in the
economy.
4.3.1. Benchmark Contract
We consider a benchmark contract between a pair of worker-firm (i, j) that are matched
together, where the worker has the outside option of r(i, j) from leaving the match. This is
a contract between one firm and one worker without any regard for the labor market. Firm
j’s problem is as follows:

max
e,w(i,j,e)

v(i, j, e) − w(i, j, e)

s.t. w(i, j, e) − c(e) ≥ r(i, j),

where r(i, j) is an outside option of the worker that depends only on firm and worker type.
Note that, in this contract, the incentive compatibility constraint is irrelevance, since the
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eﬀort is observable. However, the individual rationality constraint is binding:

w(i, j, e) = c(e) + r(i, j)

Hence, firm j’s problem becomes the following:
max π(i, j, e) = v(i, j, e) − c(e) − r(i, j)
e

(4.1)

The solution to this problem is the induced eﬀort choice in the benchmark contract. Note
that, under Assumption 3, this eﬀort is unique and maximizes the firm’s profit.
4.3.2. Eﬃcient Eﬀort
In this section, we show that the induced eﬀort choice in the benchmark contract is the
social planner’s eﬀort choice for any given matched worker-firm pair. The social planner’s
problem is:
max s(i, j, e) = v(i, j, e) − c(e)
e

(4.2)

Lemma 8 The social planner’s eﬀort choice, for any matched pair, is the eﬀort that the
firm chooses in the benchmark contract.
Proof:

Given Assumption 3, the solution to the benchmark contract, firm’s profit maxi-

mization problem, is unique. Moreover, the solution to the social planner’s surplus maximization problem is unique, too. The surplus of a match is equal to the profit of the firm
up to a constant in the benchmark contract. Because in the firm j’s profit maximization
problem, problem 4.1, we have: s(i, j, e) = π(i, j, e) + r(i, j). Hence:
e∗ (i, j) = argmaxe s(i, j, e) = argmaxe π(i, j, e)∀i, j
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(4.3)

The social planner’s eﬀort choice is the same as the firm’s eﬀort choice in the benchmark
contract.

We call this eﬀort the eﬃcient eﬀort level for (i, j) pair. We denote the surplus at the
eﬃcient eﬀort by s∗ (i, j) = maxe s(i, j, e) = maxe π(i, j, e) + r(i, j).
4.3.3. Eﬃcient Matching
Consider the problem of a social planner who wants to maximize the total surplus in the
economy. The social planner can choose the matching and the eﬀort level of each matched
pair. Recall that the social planner selects the eﬃcient eﬀort level for any matched pair.
The following lemma shows that the total surplus at the eﬃcient eﬀort level is strictly
supermodular; therefore, positive assortative matching maximizes the total surplus and the
social planner selects positive assortative matching.
Lemma 9 Under Assumption 3:
1. Given Assumption 4 or 5, the total surplus at the eﬃcient eﬀort level is strictly supermodular.
2. Given Assumption 4, the eﬃcient eﬀort e∗ (i, j) is increasing in the worker’s type and
the firm’s type.
3. Given Assumption 5, the eﬃcient eﬀort e∗ (i, j) is decreasing in the worker’s type and
the firm’s type.
Proof:
1. By the proof of Lemma 8, the eﬃcient eﬀort level maximizes the surplus of a match.
Therefore, by first order condition, we have:
se (i, j, e∗ (i, j)) = 0.
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(4.4)

We want to show that, the total surplus at the eﬃcient eﬀort level is supermodular
under either Assumption 4 or 5. By taking cross partial derivative of the surplus, at
the eﬃcient eﬀort level, we have:
s∗ij = sij + sie e∗j + sje e∗i + see e∗i e∗j + se e∗ij .

By equation (4.4), se is zero at the eﬃcient level of eﬀort:
s∗ij = sij + sie e∗j + sje e∗i + see e∗i e∗j
ej
ei
ei
ei
⇒ s∗ij = sij + sie (− see
) + sje (− ssee
) + see (− ssee
)(− ssee
)

s

⇒

s∗ij = sij −

sie sej
see

sei sje
see

−

⇒ s∗ij = sij −

sie sej
see .

+

sei sej
see

(4.5)

Note that sij = vij ; which is strictly positive by Assumption 3. Therefore, if sie sej ≥ 0,
then the total surplus at the eﬃcient eﬀort level is strictly supermodular. Under Assumption 4, we have that sie sej ≥ 0, because sie ≥ 0 and sej ≥ 0. Under Assumption
5, we have that sie sej ≥ 0, because sie ≤ 0 and sej ≤ 0. Hence, the surplus at the
eﬃcient eﬀort level is strictly supermodular under either Assumption 4 or Assumption
5.
2. Follows from Topkis Theorem (Topkis (1998)).
3. Follows from Topkis Theorem (Topkis (1998)).

The main point in the proof of Lemma 9 is that the super-modularity or sub-modularity
of the eﬃcient eﬀort does not aﬀect the super-modularity and sub-modularity of the total
surplus at the eﬃcient eﬀort level. Therefore, the curvature of the marginal product of
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eﬀort or the marginal cost of eﬀort does not aﬀect the eﬃciency of PAM because the total
surplus is evaluated at the surplus maximizing eﬀort level. In section 4.5.1, we show that
whether PAM has a higher or lower total output compared with other matchings depends
on the curvature of the marginal product of eﬀort and the marginal cost of eﬀort. Similarly,
whether PAM has a higher or lower total labor compared with other matchings depends on
the curvature of the marginal product of eﬀort and the marginal cost of eﬀort.
Note that a worker may work less at a more productive firm. Moreover, a better worker may
work less than a less able worker at a given firm. Nevertheless, the unique eﬃcient matching
is positive assortative matching. Stated diﬀerently, eﬃciency requires the matching of best
worker to the best firm even though the best worker puts in the least amount of work
compared with any other worker at this firm.

4.4. Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness
In this section, we construct a contracting equilibrium. We characterize the set of all
contracting equilibria. We show that the outcome of any contracting equilibrium involves
the eﬃcient eﬀort level for any matched worker-firm pair and the eﬃcient matching.
The following lemma shows that an equilibrium exists.8
Lemma 10 Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the eﬃcient eﬀort for each worker-firm pair,
positive assortative matching, and the subsequent wage schedule forms a contracting equilibrium:
1. ŵ(1, 1, e∗ (1, 1)) = c(e∗ (1, 1)),
2. ŵ(j, j, e∗ (j, j)) = bj + c(e∗ (j, j)) for j > 1,9
3. ŵ(j + 1, j, e∗ (j + 1, j)) = v(j + 1, j, e∗ (j + 1, j)) + bj + c(e∗ (j, j)) − v(j, j, e∗ (j, j)) for
j > 1,
8
9

We assume that I = J = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} for clarity in this lemma.
bj is large enough to make worker j indiﬀerent between working at firm j − 1 and firm j.
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4. ŵ(i, j, e) = 0 for any other match or eﬀort level.
Proof: In the appendix.
In this equilibrium, firm j oﬀers worker j a rent for working at firm j plus compensation
for the cost of exerting the eﬃcient amount of labor. Moreover, firm j oﬀers worker j + 1
a wage such that the firm’s profit when hiring worker j + 1 is equal to its profit when the
firm hires worker j, given that both workers will exert the eﬃcient eﬀort. In other words,
firm j competes with firm j + 1 for worker j + 1. Therefore, the rent that firm j + 1 pays
the worker j + 1 is pinned down by firm j’s wage oﬀer to worker j + 1.
The following lemma shows that, in any contracting equilibrium, the eﬀort on the equilibrium path for any matched worker-firm pair is unique and eﬃcient.
Lemma 11 Under Assumptions 3 and 4 or Assumptions 3 and 5, in any contracting equilibrium, on the equilibrium path, workers choose the eﬃcient eﬀort level ê(i) = e∗ (i, µ̂(i)).
Proof: In the appendix.
Given that the eﬀort choice on the equilibrium path is eﬃcient, we show that, in any
contracting equilibrium, the matching is unique and eﬃcient.
Theorem 10 Under Assumptions 3 and 4 or 3 and 5, in any contracting equilibrium, the
matching is positive assortative.
Proof: In the appendix.
This result holds under either Assumption 4 or Assumption 5. Recall that, under Assumption 5, the best worker works less than any other worker at the best firm. Moreover, given
the eﬃcient matching, the best worker works less than all other workers. Similarly, the least
able worker has the highest working hours in the economy.
Corollary 11 Under Assumptions 3 and 5, in any contracting equilibrium, the best worker
is matched with the best firm and works less than any other worker. In contrast, the least
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able worker works more than any other worker.
To summarize, a contracting equilibrium exists, and matching and the eﬀort levels on the
equilibrium path are unique, so the total output and the total surplus in any contracting
equilibrium are the same.

4.5. Eliminating all Frictions
In Section 4.5.1, we analyze the eﬀect of eliminating all frictions in a labor market on the
total surplus and total output. If there is no friction in the marker, the unique matching
in any equilibrium is PAM. We consider any departure from PAM as a friction in the labor
market. Stated diﬀerently, if the observed matching in a labor market is not PAM, then
there are some frictions in the labor market. We show that, under Assumption 3 and either
Assumption 4 or Assumption 5, the frictionless market has a higher total surplus than a
labor market with some frictions but it may have lower total output. First, we provide
an example where the production function is strictly supermodular in firm’s technology
and worker’s ability. At the eﬃcient level of eﬀort, all firms produce the same amount of
output irrespective of their matched workers. Therefore, the total output is the same under
any matching, but the total surplus is strictly higher under PAM than under any other
matching. We characterize three sets of suﬃcient conditions and provide simple examples
for each set of conditions. Under the first set of conditions, the total output increases when
all frictions are eliminated; however, this increase is an upper bound on the increase in
the total surplus. Under the second set of conditions, the total output increases, but the
increase in the total output is a lower bound for the increase in the total surplus. However,
under the third set of conditions, the total output decreases when all search frictions are
eliminated. In Section 4.5.2, we show that, fixing an equilibrium, the total profit of all firms
always increases when all search frictions are eliminated.
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4.5.1. The Total Output
Suppose that the labor market is not eﬃcient because of a friction in labor market. Consider
a policy that decreased the total output. Can we conclude that eﬃciency has decreased as
the result of this policy? In contrast, if a policy increased the total output, can we say that
there was a eﬃciency gain? In this section, we answer these questions.
Given two pairs of matched worker-firm pairs, (i, j), (i′ , j ′ ), we define meet of the two vectors
as the coordinate-wise minimum of the two vectors (i, j) ∧ (i′ , j ′ ) = (min{i, i′ }, min{j, j ′ })
and joint of the two vectors as the coordinate-wise maximum of the two vectors (i, j) ∨
(i′ , j ′ ) = (max{i, i′ }, max{j, j ′ }).
Lemma 12 Given any matching µ, there exists a sequence of meet and joint operations
with length n such that the resulting matching is PAM.
Proof: In the appendix.
In the following example, there is a complementarity in the production function between
worker’s type and firm’s technology. Hence, one may think that, by facilitating the match
between the best worker and the best firm, production will increase (by allowing the matched
pair to choose the eﬃcient eﬀort). However, considering the eﬃcient labor choice, the production of a firm is constant. Moreover, the production of all firms is the same independent
of which worker they are matched to. Stated diﬀerently, by changing the matching, the
total surplus changes but the total output is constant. Therefore, if a researcher uses the
output to measure the eﬃciency gain (or loss) from a policy regrading a change in labor
market frictions, the conclusion will be wrong.
Example 2
v(i, j, e) = log(ij + e), c(e) =

e
,
k

where k ∈ [1.69, 2] and I, J ⊂ [1, 1.3]. Note that sij > 0, sei < 0, sej < 0.
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The eﬃcient eﬀort is e∗ (i, j) = k − ij; hence, the eﬃcient eﬀort is submodular. The total
output at the eﬃcient eﬀort is v(i, j, e∗ (i, j)) = log(k). The total surplus at the eﬃcient
eﬀort is s(i, j, e∗ (i, j)) = log(k) − k + ij. The total output is constant for any matching.
Therefore, PAM maximizes the total surplus and the total leisure. PAM minimizes the total
labor. However, changing the matching does not aﬀect the total output.
It is not always the case that the total output is constant at the eﬃcient eﬀort level. Consider
the following example:
Example 3
v(i, j, e) = ije, c(e) = ke2 , s(i, j, e) = ije − ke2 ,
where k > 0 is large enough to satisfy Assumption 3; i.e., ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J : k > ij.
The eﬃcient eﬀort is e∗ (i, j) =

ij
2k ;

hence, the eﬃcient eﬀort is supermodular. The total

output at the eﬃcient eﬀort is v(i, j, e∗ (i, j)) =
is s(i, j, e∗ (i, j)) =

(ij)2
2k

−

(ij)2
4k

=

(ij)2
4k

(ij)2
2k .

The total surplus at the eﬃcient eﬀort

. Therefore, PAM maximizes the total surplus, the

total labor, and the total output, but it minimizes the total leisure.
We characterize a set of suﬃcient conditions under which positive assortative matching
maximizes the total surplus and total output. Under these conditions, if the total output
increases as a result of a change in labor market, then we know that the total surplus has
increased as well. However, the increase in the total output is an upper bound on the
increase in the total surplus under Assumption 4. We use the result from Kamali-Shahdadi
(2016) to analyze the argmax of the firm’s profit maximization problem (the eﬃcient labor
choice). If the marginal profit of labor is supermodular and convex in labor, then the the
eﬃcient labor choice is supermodular,10 and PAM maximizes the total labor, total surplus,
and total output.
10

See Kamali-Shahdadi (2016) for formal proof.
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Condition 5 The marginal surplus of eﬀort is supermodular and convex in eﬀort:
seij (e, i, j) ≥ 0, seei (e, i, j) ≥ 0, seej (e, i, j) ≥ 0, seee (e, i, j) ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ [0, 1], i, j,

with at least one strict inequality.
Theorem 11
Under Condition 5:
1. Given Assumptions 3 and 4 or Assumptions 3 and 5, the frictionless labor market,
compared with a labor market with some frictions, has a higher total surplus, higher
total output, and higher total labor.
2. Under Assumptions 3 and 4, eliminating all frictions in the labor market results in
a higher total output and eﬃciency gain; however, the increase in the total output is
greater than the increase in the total surplus.
Proof: In the appendix.
Under the second set of conditions that we characterize, if the total output increases as a
result of a policy change related to labor market frictions, then we can conclude that the
total surplus increased as a result of this policy; moreover, the increase in the total surplus
is at least equal to the increase in the total output. Consider the following example:
Example 4
1

1

v(i, j, e) = e(i ρ + j ρ )ρ , c(e) =
1

1

where ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J : 0 < (i ρ + j ρ )ρ <
1

ρ
ek+1
, ρ > 1, k > 1, < 1,
k+1
k

1
k+1 .
1

ρ

The eﬃcient eﬀort is e(i, j) = (i ρ + j ρ ) k .

ρ
k

< 1; hence, the eﬃcient eﬀort is submodular.
1

1

The total output at the eﬃcient eﬀort is v(i, j, e∗ (i, j)) = (i ρ + j ρ )
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ρ(1+k)
k

. The total surplus

1

1

k
at the eﬃcient eﬀort is s(i, j, e∗ (i, j)) = ( k+1
)(i ρ + j ρ )

ρ(1+k)
k

. Therefore, PAM maximizes

the total surplus, total leisure, and total output, but it minimizes the total labor.
Condition 6 The marginal surplus of eﬀort is submodular and concave in eﬀort:
seij (e, i, j) ≤ 0, seei (e, i, j) ≤ 0, seej (e, i, j) ≤ 0, seee (e, i, j) ≤ 0, ∀e ∈ [0, 1], i, j,

with at least one strict inequality. Moreover,
(sei sej )(ve seee + 2s2ee − vee see ) + (s2ee )(ve seij − sij see ) − (ve see )(seei sej + seej sei ) ≥ 0.

Theorem 12
Under Condition 6:
1. Given Assumptions 3 and 4 or Assumptions 3 and 5, the frictionless market, compared
with a market with some frictions, has a higher total surplus, higher total output, and
lower total labor.
2. Under Assumptions 3 and 5, eliminating frictions in the labor market results in higher
total output and eﬃciency gain; moreover, the increase in the total surplus is greater
than the increase in the total output.
Proof: In the appendix.
It is not always the case that an increase in the total output implies an increase in the total
surplus. Under the third set of conditions that we characterize, if the total output decreases
as a result of policy in the labor market, the total surplus increases as a result of this policy.
Example 5
1
e
v(i, j, e) = log(ij + e + 1) − (( )(log(ij + 3))), c(e) = ,
3
k
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where k ∈ (2.69, 3) and I, J ∈ [1, 1.3]. Note that sij =

1+e
− 1
(ij+e+1)2 (ij+3)2

> 0, sei < 0, sej < 0.

The eﬃcient eﬀort is e(i, j) = k − ij − 1; hence, the eﬃcient eﬀort is submodular. The
total output at the eﬃcient eﬀort is v(i, j, e∗ (i, j)) = log(k) − (( 13 )(log(ij + 3))); hence, the
total output at the eﬃcient eﬀort is submodular. The total surplus at the eﬃcient eﬀort is
s(i, j, e∗ (i, j)) = log(k) − (( 31 )(log(ij + 3))) +

ij
k

− 1 + k1 . Therefore, PAM maximizes the

total surplus and total leisure. However, PAM minimizes the total output and total labor.
Condition 7 The marginal surplus of eﬀort is submodular, concave in eﬀort, and:
seij (e, i, j) ≤

(

)

(sij ), seei (e, i, j) ≤ 0, seej (e, i, j) ≤ 0,
( )
seee (e, i, j) ≤ sveee (cee − see ), ∀e ∈ [0, 1], i, j,
see
ve

with at least one strict inequality.
Theorem 13
Under Condition 7:
1. Given Assumptions 3 and 4 or Assumptions 3 and 5, the frictionless market has the
highest total surplus, lowest total output, and lowest total labor.
2. Given Assumptions 3 and 4 or Assumptions 3 and 5, eliminating frictions in the labor
market results in a lower total output and higher total surplus.
Proof: In the appendix.
4.5.2. The Total Profit
In this section, we show that, for a given equilibrium wage schedule, if a policy eliminates
frictions in the labor market, then the total surplus and the total profit move in the same
direction.

11

11

However, if firms react to changes in labor market frictions by changing the wage schedule that they
oﬀer to workers, the total profit may decrease while the total surplus increases.
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Theorem 14 Given a contracting equilibrium,
1. if the total surplus is supermodular at the optimum level of eﬀort, then the total profit
of firms is supermodular, and
2. if the total surplus is submodular at the optimum level of eﬀort, then the total profit
of firms is submodular.
Proof: In the appendix.

4.6. Conclusion
If the eﬀective labor supplied by workers does not depend on the firm they are matched
with, then the total output measures the welfare. However, if labor is a complement to or a
substitute for a firm’s technology, then a worker’s labor choice changes when he/she matches
with a more productive firm. We show that PAM is eﬃcient and incurs in any contracting
equilibrium. However, PAM may minimize or maximize the total output. Therefore, if one
considers the endogenous labor choice of workers, then the total output can be a misleading
measure of welfare: change in the total output may underestimate or overestimate an
increase in the total surplus; moreover, the total output may decrease when the total surplus
increases. We characterize two sets of suﬃcient conditions on the production function and
cost function for which the total output and welfare move in the same direction. Under the
first set of conditions, if the total surplus increases, the total output increases more than the
total surplus. Stated diﬀerently, the total output overestimates the eﬃciency gains. Under
the second set of conditions, if the total surplus increases, the total output increases but
the increase is less than the increase in the total surplus. In other words, the total output
underestimates the eﬃciency gains. We identify a third set of conditions under which the
total output decreases while the total surplus increases; i.e., the total output misrepresents
the welfare eﬀect of a policy.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1.

We find an optimal wage contract by finding binding constraints.

Consider an optimal solution to the minimization problem. The minimization problem is a
standard convex problem. The existence of an optimal solution is guaranteed (see Grossman
and Hart (1983)). Denote the optimal solution by (u∗1 , u∗2 ). We characterize the necessary
conditions for (u∗1 , u∗2 ) to be an optimal solution by finding which constraint is binding.
Given (u∗1 , u∗2 ), find an attorney i such that:
r(qi ) + Eλi (c(e2 , dj )) = Rλ .

At least one attorney with this property exists. Denote an attorney with this property by
i∗ .
If the (IR) constraint for i∗ is satisfied, then all individual rationality constraints are satisfied. Because the left-hand side of (IR) is the same for all i ∈ I, the right-hand side is
maximized for attorney i∗ .
We claim that (IR) for i∗ binds. Suppose (IR) does not bind for i∗ . Then we can reduce u∗1
and u∗2 uniformly to u∗1 − ϵ, u∗2 − ϵ such that (IR) is still satisfied for all i ∈ I. Note that this
process does not aﬀect (IC) constraints. Therefore, we can reduce the objective function,
i.e., we can reduce the cost of the government, a contradiction with optimality of (u∗1 , u∗2 ).
If (IC) for the highest d is satisfied, then all incentive constraints are satisfied. Because
the left-hand side of the (IC) constraint is the same for all d ∈ D, the right-hand side is
maximized at dN , the largest element in D.
Finally, we claim that (IC) for the highest d binds. However, suppose (IC) for the highest
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d does not bind. Consider the following relaxed problem:

minu1 ,u2

∑
i∈I

ph h(u2 ) + (1 − ph )h(u1 )

s.t.
u1 + ph (u2 − u1 ) ≥ Rλ .

After simplifying the constraint, we get:

minu1 ,u2

∑
i∈I

ph h(u2 ) + (1 − ph )h(u1 )

s.t.
(1 − ph )u1 + ph u2 ≥ Rλ .
ϵ
Suppose (u˜1 , u˜2 ) is a solution to this relaxed problem, define u†1 = u˜1 − 1−p
and u†2 = u˜2 + pϵh .
h

Because the constraint is satisfied at (u˜1 , u˜2 ), it is also satisfied at (u†1 , u†2 ). (u˜1 , u˜2 ) is an
optimal solution to this relaxed problem; therefore, the following problem must be optimized
at ϵ = 0:

minϵ

∑
i∈I

ph h(u˜2 +

ϵ
ph )

+ (1 − ph )h(u˜1 −

ϵ
1−ph )

s.t.
(1 − ph )u˜1 + ph u˜2 ≥ Rλ .

Taking first-order condition with respect to ϵ and evaluating it at ϵ = 0, we get:
∑
i∈I

ph ( p1h )h′ (u˜2 ) −

1−ph ′
1−ph h (u˜1 )

⇒ h′ (u˜2 ) = h′ (u˜1 )
⇒ u˜1 = u˜2 .
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=0

Consider the (IC) in the original problem. At u˜1 = u˜2 left-hand side of (IC) is zero. Under
Assumption 1, high eﬀort costs more than low eﬀort; hence, the right-hand side of (IC) is
strictly positive. Thus, at (u˜1 , u˜2 ), (IC) is violated. Therefore, (IC) constraints bind in the
original problem.
Using this binding constraint, we can find an optimal wage contract. There is only one
wage contract that satisfies all these necessary conditions. The optimal wage contract is:
u∗1 = Rλ − ph

( c(eh ,dN )−c(el ,dN ) )
ph −pl

,

(
)
l ,dN )
u∗2 = Rλ + (1 − ph ) c(eh ,dNph)−c(e
.
−pl

Proof of Theorem 3. Given an allocation λ and a set of hired attorneys I, from Lemma
1 the optimal wage contract is:
u∗1 = Rλ − ph

( c(eh ,dN )−c(el ,dN ) )
ph −pl

,

(
)
l ,dN )
u∗2 = Rλ + (1 − ph ) c(eh ,dNph)−c(e
.
−pl
Hence, the government’s problem for finding the optimal allocation is:

minλ

∑
i∈I

ph h(u∗2 ) + (1 − ph )h(u∗1 ),

or simply:
minλ ph h(u∗2 ) + (1 − ph )h(u∗1 ).

The objective function depends on λ only through Rλ , and it is strictly increasing in Rλ .
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Therefore, the government’s problem is:

minλ Rλ .

Thus, the optimal allocation given the set I solves:

min max
λ





r(qi ) +

∑
j∈J



ϕλ (i, j)(c(eh , dj ))



,
i∈I

which is equivalent to the linear program (LP*). Given the solution to this program,
{ϕ∗ (i, j)}i∈I,j∈J , we can use the Birkhoﬀ-von Neumann decomposition algorithm to find
the optimal allocation λ.

Proof of Lemma 5. (If direction:) Suppose r(qi ) = r for all i ∈ I, and the uniform
random allocation is not optimal. Then there exists λ′ such that:
max {r + Eλ′ (c(eh , d))}i∈I < max {r + Eλu (c(eh , d))}i∈I .
r + Eλu (c(eh , d)) is constant for all i ∈ I and equal to r +

∑
j∈J

∑

max {r + Eλ′ (c(eh , d))}i∈I < r +

j∈J

(c(eh ,dj )
.
N

Hence,

(c(eh ,dj )
.
N

Then under λ′ we have:
∑
∑
(c(eh ,dj )
r + j∈J ϕλ′ (i, j)c(eh , dj ) < r + j∈J N
∀i ∈ I
∑
(
)
)
(
∑
∑
∑
j∈J (c(eh ,dj )
′
⇒
r
+
ϕ
(i,
j)c(e
,
d
)
<
r
+
j
h
i∈I
j∈J λ
i∈I
N

⇒
⇒
⇒

∑

∑
i∈I

∑
j∈J

j∈J ϕλ′ (i, j)c(eh , dj ) <

∑
i∈I

ϕ (i, j)c(eh , dj ) <

∑
j∈J

λ′

c(eh , dj ) <

79

∑
j∈J

∑

∑

j∈J

i∈I
∑

∑

i∈I

j∈J

(c(eh , dj )),

(c(eh ,dj )
N
(c(eh ,dj )
N

a contradiction.
(Only if direction:) If r(qi ) is not constant, there exist i′ , i′′ ∈ I such that r(qi′ ) < r(qi′′ ).
Hence, under the uniform random allocation:

r(qi′ ) + Eλu (c(eh , d)) < Rλu ,

and:
r(qi′ ) + Eλu (c(eh , d)) < r(qi′′ ) + Eλu (c(eh , d)).
Fix an arbitrary small ϵ > 0 and construct a new allocation λ̄ such that:
ϕλ̄ (i′ , 1) =

1−ϵ
N ,

ϕλ̄ (i′ , N ) =

1+ϵ
N ,

ϕλ̄ (i, 1) =

1
N

+

ϵ
(N −1)N

∀i ∈ I, i ̸= i′ ,

ϕλ̄ (i, N ) =

1
N

−

ϵ
(N −1)N

∀i ∈ I, i ̸= i′ ,

ϕλ̄ (i, j) =

1
N

∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J, j ̸= 1, N.

Intuitively, the new allocation rule is constructed from the uniform random allocation with
a few changes. i′ gets the easiest case with lower probability under λ̄. Everyone else gets the
easiest case with higher probability under λ̄. However, i′ gets the hardest case with higher
probability under λ̄. Everyone else gets the hardest case with lower probability under λ̄.
Note that λ̄ is indeed an allocation because each row and column of Φ adds up to 1. For
an arbitrary small ϵ > 0 we have:

r(qi′ ) + Eλ̄ (c(eh , d)) < r(qi′′ ) + Eλ̄ (c(eh , d)).
For any i ̸= i′ :
r(qi ) + Eλ̄ (c(eh , d)) < r(qi ) + Eλu (c(eh , d)),
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one such i is i = i′′ :
r(qi′′ ) + Eλ̄ (c(eh , d)) < r(qi′′ ) + Eλu (c(eh , d)) ≤ Rλu .
However, for i′ :
r(qi′ ) + Eλ̄ (c(eh , d)) > r(qi′ ) + Eλu (c(eh , d)).
Therefore:
r(qi′ ) + Eλu (c(eh , d)) < r(qi′′ ) + Eλ̄ (c(eh , d)) ≤ Rλu .
We can conclude that
Rλ̄ < Rλu .
This is a contradiction with optimality of the uniform random allocation.

Proof of Theorem 4. From Lemma 5 we know that the uniform random allocation is
the optimal allocation. We need to show that a nondiscriminatory wage contract is optimal
even if the government can use discriminatory wage contracts.
Consider a selection rule, an allocation rule Λ, and an optimal discriminatory wage contract
{u†1 (i, j), u†2 (i, j)}i∈I a ,j∈J . We need to show that the cost of government under this contract
is higher than the cost of the government under the status quo contract. We restrict our
attention to optimal discriminatory wage contracts only because if this claim is true for any
contract that uses an optimal discriminatory wage contract then it is true for any other
contract, too.
Denote the set of hired attorneys under this contract by I, the allocation by λ, and the
optimal discriminatory wage contract by {u†1 (i, j), u†2 (i, j)}i∈I,j∈J . After the contract is
signed, attorneys and indigent defendants are matched based on λ. Note that each attorney
is assigned to one indigent defendant, and denote this realized matching by µ. The cost of
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government if µ is realized is:
Cµ =

∑

(p2 h(u∗2 (i, µ−1 (i))) + (1 − p2 )h(u∗1 (i, µ−1 (i))),

i∈I

where:
u†1 (i, µ−1 (i)) = r(qi ) + c(eh , dµ−1 (i) ) − ph

( c(eh )−c(el ) )
ph −pl

,

(
)
l)
u†2 (i, µ−1 (i)) = r(qi ) + c(eh , dµ−1 (i) ) + (1 − ph ) c(ephh)−c(e
.
−pl
Finding an optimal discriminatory wage contract is simple. For each possible match µ(j̃) =
ĩ, there are two binding constraints, an incentive compatibility constraint for ĩ when he/she
is matched to indigent defendant j̃, and an individual rationality constraint for ĩ when
he/she is matched to indigent defendant j̃. One can show these constraints bind at optimality. Hence, the optimal wage contract u†1 (i, j), u†2 (i, j) is derived by solving each possible
match under the allocation λ. Note that c(e, dj ) = c(e) − g(dj ) implies c(eh , dj ) − c(el , dj ) =
c(eh ) − c(el ).
For any set of hired attorneys I, we know that r(qi ) > r(q1 ) = r∀i ∈ I. Therefore:
u∗1 (i, µ−1 (i)) ≥ r + c(eh , dµ−1 (i) ) − ph

( c(eh )−c(el ) )
ph −pl

u∗2 (i, µ−1 (i)) ≥ r + c(eh , dµ−1 (i) ) + (1 − ph )

Define
ξ = r − ph

( c(eh )−c(el ) )
ph −pl

ζ = r + (1 − ph )
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,

( c(eh )−c(el ) )
ph −pl

.

,

( c(eh )−c(el ) )
ph −pl

.

Hence,
u∗1 (i, µ−1 (i)) ≥ c(eh , dµ−1 (i) ) + ξ,

(A.1)

u∗2 (i, µ−1 (i)) ≥ c(eh , dµ−1 (i) ) + ζ.

(A.2)

The cost of the government under the uniform random allocation with nondiscriminatory
wage contract is
Cu =

∑

(p2 h(u†2 ) + (1 − p2 )h(u†1 )),

i∈I

where:
u†1 = r + Ed (c(eh , d)) − ph

( c(eh )−c(el ) )

= Ed (c(eh , d)) + ξ,
)
(
l)
= Ed (c(eh , d)) + ζ.
u†2 = r + Ed (c(eh , d)) + (1 − ph ) c(ephh)−c(e
−pl
Suppose there exists

i′

∈ I such that

ph −pl

u∗2 (i′ , µ−1 (i′ ))

̸=

∑
i∈I

u∗2 (i,µ−1 (i))
,
N

i.e., at least two

attorneys are getting diﬀerent wages under the high signal. Under Assumption 1, h(.) is a
strictly convex function. By Jensen’s inequality, we have:
∑
i∈I

h(

∑

u∗2 (i,µ−1 (i))
)
N

<

i∈I

h(u∗2 (i,µ−1 (i))
.
N

(A.3)

From equation (A.2) we have:
∑
u∗2 (i,µ−1 (i))
i∈I (c(eh ,dµ−1 (i) )+ζ)
≥
N
N
∑
∑
c(eh ,dj )
i∈I c(eh ,dµ−1 (i) )
= ζ + j∈J N
= ζ + Ed (c(eh , d))
N
∑

i∈I

= ζ+

(A.4)
= u†2 .

(A.5)

Under Assumption 1, h(.) is a strictly increasing function; therefore:
h(u†2 ) ≤ h(

∑
i∈I

83

u∗2 (i,µ−1 (i))
).
N

(A.6)

Observe that that if there does not exist i′ ∈ I such that u∗2 (i′ , µ−1 (i′ )) ̸=

∑
i∈I

u∗2 (i,µ−1 (i))
,
N

then for at least one attorney i ∈ I we must have that r(qi ) > r. In this case, the Jensen’s
inequality is a weak inequality; however, inequity (A.5) is a strict inequality. Therefore,
inequality (A.6) holds with strict inequality.
By comparing inequality (A.3) and inequality (A.6), we get:
∑

h(u†2 ) <

i∈I

Similarly:

∑

∑

h(u∗2 (i, µ−1 (i)).

i∈I

h(u†1 ) <

i∈I

∑

h(u∗1 (i, µ−1 (i)).

i∈I

Therefore:
Cu < Cµ .
We can conclude that the status quo system, i.e., the merit-based selection rule, the uniform
random allocation rule, and nondiscriminatory wage contracts, is the optimal contract even
among discriminatory wage contracts.

Proof of Lemma 6
Consider two classes θ′ = (θ1′ , ..., θn′ ) and θ′′ = (θ1′′ , ..., θn′′ ). Order all elements of these
two vectors in descending order, denoted by θ̄1 , θ̄2 , ..., θ̄2n , i.e., θ̄1 is greater than or equal
to all elements of both classes, θ̄2 is the second greatest element of all elements of both
classes, and so on. θ̄1 is either in class θ′ or in class θ′′ . Consider the permutation of
these two classes such that θ̄1 is the first element of one these two classes. Similarly θ̄2 is
either class θ′ or in class θ′′ . Consider the permutation of these two classes such that θ̄1 is
the first element of one of these two classes and θ̄2 is the second element of one of these
two classes. We can do the same for θ̄1 , θ̄2 , ..., θ̄n . Therefore, we have a permutation of
two classes, where θ̄1 is the first element of one class. Moreover, the first element of the
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other class is one of the following: θ̄n+1 , θ̄n+2 , ..., θ̄2n . Note that θ̄1 ≥ θ̄n+1 , θ̄n+2 , ..., θ̄2n .
Similarly, θ̄2 is the second element of one of the two classes, and the second element of the
other class is one of θ̄n+1 , θ̄n+2 , ..., θ̄2n . The same is true for any element i between 1 and
n. θ̄i is the ith element of one these classes, and the ith element of the other class is one
of θ̄n+1 , θ̄n+2 , ..., θ̄2n . Furthermore, θ̄i ≥ θ̄n+1 , θ̄n+2 , ..., θ̄2n . Hence, using coordinate-wise
maximum and minimum on these permutations results in having θ̄1 , θ̄2 , ..., θ̄n in one class
and θ̄n+1 , θ̄n+2 , ..., θ̄2n in the other class. Therefore, by using these permutations for these
two classes, one-step sorting is equivalent to sorting.

Proof of Theorem 5
Consider a function f (e, θ); maximizing with respect to e we have:
fe (e∗ , θ) = 0.

By the Implicit Function Theorem, we have:
e∗ = g(θ) ⇒

∂fe

∂e∗
feθ
∂θ
= − ∂fei = − i .
∂θi
fee

(A.7)

∂e

Therefore,
2f
fee
∂ 2 e∗
eθi θj + feee feθi feθj − feeθi feθj fee − feeθj feθi fee
=−
.
3
∂θi ∂θj
fee

(A.8)

Condition 8
2
fee
feθi θj + feee feθi feθj − feeθi feθj fee − feeθj feθi fee > 0, ∀e ∈ [0, 1], i, j, θi ∈ R+ , θj ∈ R+ .

Condition 9
2
fee
feθi θj + feee feθi feθj − feeθi feθj fee − feeθj feθi fee < 0, ∀e ∈ [0, 1], i, j, θi ∈ R+ , θj ∈ R+ .
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If Condition 8 is satisfied, then (A.8) is strictly positive. Moreover, if Condition 1 is satisfied,
then Condition 8 is satisfied. Hence, the argmax is strictly supermodular if Condition 1 is
satisfied. If Condition 9 is satisfied, then (A.8) is strictly negative. Moreover, if condition
2 is satisfied, then Condition 9 is satisfied. Hence, the argmax is strictly submodular if
Condition 2 is satisfied.
Note that
2
fee
feθi θj + feee feθi feθj − feeθi feθj fee − feeθj feθi fee ,

is either zero, strictly positive, or strictly negative locally. Therefore, locally the argmax is
either strictly supermodular, strictly submodular, or modular.

Proof of Example 1
Define θ̄ = ( n1 )

∑

i∈µ(t) θi .

We have:

Pθi

= ne .

Pe

= θ̄.

fθi

= ne u′ (.).

fθi ,θj

= ( ne )2 u′′ (.).

fθi ,θj ,e = 2( ne )u′′ (.) + θ̄( ne )2 u′′′ (.).
fe

= θ̄u′ (.) − ce .

fe,e

= (θ̄)2 u′′ (.) − ce,e .

fe,e,e

= (θ̄)3 u′′′ (.) − ce,e,e .

fθi ,e,e = n2 (θ̄)u′′ (.) + ne (θ̄)2 u′′′ (.).
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Note that fθi ,θj ,e and fθi ,e,e are strictly negative, and fe,e,e is negative. Therefore, Condition
2 is satisfied.
Pi∗

= Pe ei + pi ,

∗
Pi,j

= pe,e ei ej + pe,j ei + pe ei,j + pe,i ej + Pi,j
= n1 (ei + ej ) + θ̄ei,j .

∗ < 0:
Want to show Pi,j

1
n (ei

+ ej ) + θ̄ei,j < 0 ⇔ 2ei < −nθ̄ei,j

⇔

e,i
−2 fe,e
< −nθ̄ f−1
3 (Φ)

⇔

2fe,i < −nθ̄ f 12 (Φ)

⇔

f

e,e

e,e

2
nθ̄

<

−(Φ)
,
2 f
fe,e
e,i

where
2 f
−Φ = −fe,e
e,θi ,θj − fe,e,e fe,θi fe,θj + fe,e,θi fe,θj fe,e + fe,e,θj fe,θi fe,e
2 f
= −fe,e
e,θi ,θj − fe,e,e fe,θi fe,θj + 2fe,e,θi fe,θj fe,e .

Note that
2
−fe,e
fe,θi ,θj ≥ 0, −fe,e,e fe,θi fe,θj ≥ 0.

Therefore,
−Φ ≥ 2fe,e,θi fe,θj fe,e .
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2 f
Because fe,e
e,i ≥ 0, it is enough to show:

2fe,e,θi fe,θj fe,e
fe,e,θi
2
1
<
<
⇔
.
2
fe,e fe,i
fe,e
nθ̄
nθ̄
Note that fe,e = (θ̄)2 u′′ (.) − ce,e and ce,e > 0; hence, fe,e ≤ (θ̄)2 u′′ (.). Therefore,
fe,e,θi
.
(θ̄)2 u′′ (.)

fe,e,θi
fe,e

≥

It is enough to show:

⇔
=

=
u′′′ (.)
u′′ (.)

<

fe,e,θi
(θ̄)2 u′′ (.)

1
n

<

fe,e,θi
(θ̄)u′′ (.)

e
2
(θ̄)u′′ (.)+ n
(θ̄)2 u′′′ (.)
n
′′
(θ̄)u (.)

=

Because

1
nθ̄

2
n
2
n

+
+

e
(θ̄)2 u′′′ (.)
n
(θ̄)u′′ (.)
e
(θ̄)2
n

(θ̄)

u′′′ (.)
u′′ (.) .

≥ 0, we have:
e
(θ̄)2 u′′′ (.)
2
2
+ n
> .
n
n
(θ̄) u′′ (.)

which is what we wanted to show.

Proof of Theorem 6
Consider a general performance function p(e, θ):
∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi

=

∂p ∂(e e=e∗ )
∂e
∂θi

+

∂p
∂θi e=e∗

⇒

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

=

(
∂ 2 p ∂e e=e∗
( ∂e∂e
∂θj

+

∂ 2 p ∂(e e=e∗ )
∂e∂θj )
∂θi

+

2
∂p ∂ (e e=e∗ )
∂e ∂θi ∂θj

+

∂p ∂(e e=e∗ )
∂e∂θi
∂θj

+

∂2p
∂θi ∂θj

)

Using (A.9) when performance is modular, i.e., peθi (e, θ) = 0, pθi θj (e, θ) = 0
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e=e∗

. (A.9)

∀e ∈ [0, 1],

∀i, j, θi ∈ R+ , θj ∈ R+ , we have:
(
)
∂(p
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

=

2

∂ p
( ∂e∂e

∂e
∂(e
)
e=e∗
e=e∗
∂θj )
∂θi

1. By Theorem 5, under Condition 1, we have
hence, we have

∂2p
∂e∂e

≥ 0. Moreover,

∂e

e=e∗

∂θi

∂2p
∂e∂e

≤ 0. Moreover,

∂e

e=e∗

∂θi

2
∂p ∂ (e e=e∗ )
∂e ∂θi ∂θj

∂(e
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

)
e=e∗

.

(A.10)

> 0. Performance is convex,

> 0 by Lemma 7. Therefore,

2. By Theorem 5, under Condition 2, we have
hence, we have

+

)
∂(e
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

> 0.

< 0. Performance is concave,

> 0 by Lemma 7. Therefore,

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

< 0.

Proof of Theorem 7
Consider a general performance function p(e, θ), and recall (A.9):
(
∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

1.

=

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

∂ 2 p ∂e e=e∗
( ∂e∂e
∂θj

+

∂ 2 p ∂(e e=e∗ )
∂e∂θj )
∂θi

+

∂p ∂(e e=e∗ )
∂e ∂θi ∂θj

+

∂p ∂(e e=e∗ )
∂e∂θi
∂θj

+

∂2p
∂θi ∂θj

)
e=e∗

.

> 0 because:

i) By convexity of performance, we have
ii) By Lemma 7, we have

∂e

e=e∗

∂θi

∂2p
∂e∂e

≥ 0.

> 0∀i ∈ I.

iii) Performance is supermodular; therefore, we have

∂2p
∂e∂θi

iv) By Assumption 1, performance is increasing in eﬀort

≥ 0∀i ∈ I.

∂p
∂e

> 0.

v) By Theorem 5, under Condition 1, the optimal eﬀort is strictly supermodular
)
∂(e
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

> 0.

vi) Performance is supermodular; therefore, we have
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∂2p
∂θi ∂θj

≥ 0.

Therefore,
2.

)
∂(p
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

> 0, i.e., sorting increases the total performance of students.

< 0 because:

i) By concavity of performance, we have
ii) By Lemma 7, we have

∂e

e=e∗

∂2p
∂e∂e

≤ 0.

> 0∀i ∈ I.

∂θi

iii) Performance is submodular; therefore, we have

∂2p
∂e∂θi

iv) By Assumption 1, performance is increasing in eﬀort

≤ 0∀i ∈ I.
∂p
∂e

> 0.

v) By Theorem 5, under Condition 2, the optimal eﬀort is strictly submodular
∂(e
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

< 0.

vi) Performance is submodular; therefore, we have
Therefore,

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

∂2p
∂θi ∂θj

≤ 0.

< 0, i.e., sorting decreases the total performance of students.

General Method
Using (A.7), (A.8), and (A.9), we have:
((
∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

+
+

∂p
∂e

(

=

∂2p
∂e∂e

)

(
−

∂2f
∂e∂θj
∂2f
∂e∂e

)(

)
+

∂2p
∂e∂θj

−

∂2f
∂e∂θi
∂2f
∂e∂e

)

∂ f 2
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f )
( ∂e∂e
) ( ∂e∂θ
)+( ∂e∂e∂e
)( ∂e∂θ
)( ∂e∂eθ
)−( ∂e∂e∂θ
)( ∂e∂θ
)( ∂e∂e
)−( ∂e∂e∂θ
)( ∂e∂θ
)( ∂e∂e
)
∂θ
2

−

(

3

i

3

2

j

2

i

3

j

2

i

2

j

(
∂p
∂e∂θi

−

∂2f
∂e∂θj
∂2f
∂e∂e

)

+
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∂2p
∂θi ∂θj

)
e=e∗

2

j

2

∂ f 3
( ∂e∂e
)

3

.

2

i

Note that

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

depends only on the primitives in this equation. Define:
(
(
Ψ(e, θ) =

+

∂p
∂e

(

(
−

∂e∂e

∂2 f
∂e∂θj
∂2 f
∂e∂e

)

)(
+

∂2p

−

∂e∂θj

∂2f
∂e∂θi
∂2f
∂e∂e

)

∂ f 2
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f
∂ f )
( ∂e∂e
) ( ∂e∂θ
)( ∂e∂θ
)−( ∂e∂e∂θ
)
)+( ∂e∂e∂e
)( ∂e∂eθ
)−( ∂e∂e∂θ
)( ∂e∂θ
)( ∂e∂e
)( ∂e∂θ
)( ∂e∂e
∂θ
2

−

)

∂2p

3

i

3

j

2

2

i

2

i

2

j

3

2

j

2

i

2

∂ f 3
)
( ∂e∂e

(
+

If Ψ(e, θ) ≥ (≤)0, then

3

j

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

∂p
∂e∂θi

−

∂2f
∂e∂θj
∂2f
∂e∂e

)
+

∂2p
∂θi ∂θj .

≥ (≤)0, i.e., sorting increases (decreases) the total perfor-

mance of students.

Proof of Theorem 8
First, we extend Theorem 5:
Lemma 13
1. If Condition 3 holds, sorting strictly increases the total eﬀort of teachers.
2. If Condition 4 holds, sorting strictly decreases the total eﬀort of teachers.
Proof: Consider a function f (e, q, θ), maximizing with respect to e:
fe (e, q, θ) = 0 ⇒ e∗ = g(q, θ)
⇒

(A.11)

∂e∗
∂θi

∂fe

f

∂θi
i
= − ∂f
.
= − feθ
e
ee
∂e
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Therefore,
f 2 feθ q + feee feθi feq − feeθi feq fee − feeq feθi fee
∂ 2 e∗
= − ee i
.
3
∂θi ∂q
fee

(A.12)

If Condition 3 is satisfied, then (A.12) is strictly positive. Moreover, Condition 3 implies
Condition 1. Therefore, if Condition 3 is satisfied, then (A.8) is strictly positive, by the
same argument as in proof of Theorem 5. Hence, the argmax is strictly supermodular if
Condition 3 is satisfied and sorting strictly increases the total eﬀort of teachers. If Condition
4 is satisfied, then (A.12) is strictly negative. Moreover, Condition 4 implies Condition 2.
Therefore, if Condition 4 is satisfied, then (A.8) is strictly negative, by the same argument as
in proof of Theorem 5. Hence, the argmax is strictly submodular if Condition 2 is satisfied
and sorting strictly decreases the total eﬀort of teachers.

Consider a general performance function p(e, q, θ), and recall (A.9):
(
∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂q

=

∂ 2 p ∂e e=e∗
( ∂e∂e
∂q

+

∂ 2 p ∂(e e=e∗ )
∂e∂q )
∂θi

+

∂p ∂(e e=e∗ )
∂e ∂θi ∂q

+

∂p ∂(e e=e∗ )
∂e∂θi
∂q

+

∂2p
∂θi ∂q

)
e=e∗

.

1. To prove the first part of the theorem, we need to show that p(e, q, θ) is pairwise
supermodular in students’ types and pairwise supermodular in each student’s type
and the teacher’s type at the optimal eﬀort. In Theorem 7, we established that under
these conditions, p(e, q, θ) is pairwise supermodular in students’ types.
We need to show that

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂q

> 0:

i) By convexity of performance, we have
ii) By Lemma 7, we have

∂e

e=e∗

∂θi

∂2p
∂e∂e

≥ 0.

> 0∀i ∈ I.

iii) Because performance is supermodular, we have

∂2p
∂e∂θi

iv) By Assumption 1, performance is increasing in eﬀort
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≥ 0∀i ∈ I and
∂p
∂e

> 0.

∂2p
∂e∂q

≥ 0∀t.

v) By Lemma 13, under Condition 3, the optimal eﬀort is strictly supermodular
∂(e
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂q

> 0.

vi) Because performance is supermodular, we have
Therefore,

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂q

∂2p
∂θi ∂q

≥ 0.

> 0. We can conclude that sorting increases the total performance

of students.
2. Similarly, to prove the second part of the theorem, we need to show that p(e, q, θ)
is pairwise submodular in students’ types and pairwise submodular in each student’s
type and the teacher’s type at the optimal eﬀort. In Theorem 7, we established that
under these conditions, p(e, q, θ) is pairwise submodular in students’ types. We need
to show that

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂q

< 0:

i) By concavity of performance, we have
ii) By Lemma 7, we have

∂e

e=e∗

∂θi

∂2p
∂e∂e

≤ 0.

> 0∀i ∈ I.

iii) Because performance is submodular, we have

∂2p
∂e∂θi

≤ 0∀i ∈ I.

iv) By Assumption 1, performance is increasing in eﬀort

∂p
∂e

> 0.

v) By Lemma 13, under Condition 4, the optimal eﬀort is strictly submodular
∂(e
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

< 0.

vi) Because performance is submodular, we have
Therefore,

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂θj

∂2p
∂θi ∂θj

≤ 0.

< 0. We can conclude that sorting decreases the total performance

of students.

Proof of Theorem 9
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Consider a general performance function p(e, q, θ), and recall (A.9):
(
∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂q

=

∂ 2 p ∂e e=e∗
( ∂e∂e
∂q

+

∂ 2 p ∂(e e=e∗ )
∂e∂q
∂θi

By proof of Theorem 8, we know that

+

∂p ∂(e e=e∗ )
∂e ∂θi ∂q

∂(p
)
e=e∗
∂θi ∂q

+

∂p ∂(e e=e∗ )
∂e∂θi
∂q

+

∂2p
∂θi ∂q

)
e=e∗

.

< 0.

Consider two classes after student sorting with NAM. By sorting these two classes, we
get two new classes with student sorting with PAM. By Theorem 8, sorting decreases the
total performance of students, i.e., the total performance of students under NAM is higher
than under PAM. Furthermore, by Theorem 8, sorting increases inequality in students’
performance, i.e., inequality in students’ performance under NAM is higher than under
PAM. To put it diﬀerently, when two classes are sorted, i.e., student sorting with PAM,
changing the matching of teachers and class from PAM to NAM has the opposite eﬀect of
sorting. Because when two classes are sorted with NAM, sorting results in two classes that
are sorted with PAM.

Proof of Lemma 10
We need to show that there is no blocking pair. Suppose i′ , j ′ and {w′ (i′ , j ′ , e)}e∈[0,1] is a
blocking pair. First observe that if this wage schedule doesn’t induce the eﬃcient eﬀort
then the same worker and firm can block with a diﬀerent wage schedule that induces the
eﬃcient eﬀort. Under this wage schedule the worker will choose an eﬀort e′ and will receive
w′ .
Note that under the eﬃcient eﬀort firm j is indiﬀerent between matching with worker i = j
and worker i = j + 1:
π(i, i, e∗ (i, i)) = π(i + 1, i, e∗ (i + 1, i)).
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Moreover, worker i + 1 is indiﬀerent between matching with firm j = i + 1 and firm j = i:
u(i + 1, i + 1, e∗ (i + 1, i + 1)) = u(i + 1, i, e∗ (i + 1, i)).

Furthermore, because total surplus is strictly supermodular, we have:
s∗ (i, i) + s∗ (i + 1, i + 1) > s∗ (i, i + 1) + s∗ (i + 1, i) ⇔
π(i, i, e∗ (i, i)) + u(i, i, e∗ (i, i)) + π(i + 1, i + 1, e∗ (i + 1, i + 1))
+u(i + 1, i + 1, e∗ (i + 1, i + 1)) > s∗ (i, i + 1) + s∗ (i + 1, i) ⇔
π(i + 1, i, e∗ (i + 1, i) + u(i, i, e∗ (i, i)) + π(i + 1, i + 1, e∗ (i + 1, i + 1)) +
u(i + 1, i, e∗ (i + 1, i)) > s∗ (i, i + 1) + s∗ (i + 1, i) ⇔
u(i, i, e∗ (i, i)) + π(i + 1, i + 1, e∗ (i + 1, i + 1)) > s∗ (i, i + 1)

Similarly we can show:
u(i + 1, i + 1, e∗ (i + 1, i + 1)) + π(i + 2, i + 2, e∗ (i + 2, i + 2)) > s∗ (i + 1, i + 2)
Adding these two inequalities and using the fact that u(i + 1, i + 1, e∗ (i + 1, i + 1)) + π(i +
1, i + 1, e∗ (i + 1, i + 1)) = s∗ (i + 1, i + 1) we have:
s∗ (i + 1, i + 1) + u(i, i, e∗ (i, i)) + π(i + 2, i + 2, e∗ (i + 2, i + 2))
> s∗ (i + 1, i + 2) + s∗ (i, i + 1) ⇔
u(i, i, e∗ (i, i)) + π(i + 2, i + 2, e∗ (i + 2, i + 2))
> s∗ (i + 1, i + 2) + s∗ (i, i + 1) − s∗ (i + 1, i + 1).
Moreover, by supermodularity of s∗ (lemma 9) we have:
s∗ (i, i + 2) < s∗ (i + 1, i + 2) + s∗ (i, i + 1) − s∗ (i + 1, i + 1).
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Hence:
u(i, i, e∗ (i, i)) + π(i + 2, i + 2, e∗ (i + 2, i + 2)) > s∗ (i, i + 2).
We can do the same process for any i′ > i. Hence no worker i and firm j were i > j can
block this CE.
Now consider i < j. First observe that:
u(i + 1, i + 1, e∗ (i + 1, i + 1)) + π(i, i, e∗ (i, i)) =
u(i + 1, i, e∗ (i + 1, i)) + π(i + 1, i, e∗ (i + 1, i) = s∗ (i + 1, i)

Hence i + 1, j = i can’t block. Moreover, by supermodularity of total surplus:
s∗ (i + 2, i + 1) + s∗ (i + 1, i) > s∗ (i + 2, i) + s∗ (i + 1, i + 1) ⇔
u(i + 2, i + 2, e∗ (i + 2, i + 2)) + π(i + 1, i + 1, e∗ (i + 1, i + 1)) +
u(i + 1, i + 1, e∗ (i + 1, i + 1)) + π(i, i, e∗ (i, i)) > s∗ (i + 2, i) + s∗ (i + 1, i + 1) ⇔
u(i + 2, i + 2, e∗ (i + 2, i + 2)) + s∗ (i + 1, i + 1) + π(i, i, e∗ (i, i))
> s∗ (i + 2, i) + s∗ (i + 1, i + 1) ⇔
u(i + 2, i + 2, e∗ (i + 2, i + 2)) + π(i, i, e∗ (i, i)) > s∗ (i + 2, i)

Hence i + 2, j = i can’t block.
Note that each worker gets at least zero utility and each firm makes positive profit, firms
are best replying, and workers are choosing the utility maximizing eﬀort level.

Proof of Lemma 11
Suppose not, then there exists at least one pair of worker-firm such that the worker is not
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choosing the eﬃcient eﬀort. Therefore, there is another contract that induces the eﬃcient
eﬀort and increases the surplus of the match. Hence, there is a wage schedule that induces
the eﬃcient eﬀort, gives the worker a strictly higher utility, and strictly increases the firm’s
profit. Therefore, a blocking pair exists, a contradiction.

Proof of Theorem 10
Suppose not, then there exists at least two pairs of worker-firm in a contracting equilibrium
such that i < i′ , j > j ′ , µ̂(i) = j, and µ̂(i′ ) = j ′ . By Lemma 9, the total surplus is strictly
supermodular in the types of firms and workers, given the eﬃcient eﬀort for every firmworker pair. Since the total surplus is strictly supermodular, if we match i with j ′ and i′
with j and let them choose the eﬃcient eﬀort, the total surplus increases:
s(i, j, e∗ (i, j)) + s(i′ , j ′ , e∗ (i′ , j ′ )) < s(i, j ′ , e∗ (i, j ′ )) + s(i′ , j, e∗ (i′ , j))

Hence, either (i, j ′ ) or (i′ , j) is a blocking pair.

Proof of Lemma 12
The following algorithm with n steps proves the result. Do the following step for i = 1, ..., n:
In step i: Select the following two pairs of matched worker-firm pairs: The pair that has
firm i as the firm and the pair that has worker i as the worker. If these are diﬀerent pairs,
use meet and joint on these two pair, otherwise go to the next step.
In each step i, worker i will match with firm j = i as the result of joint operation. Hence,
after n steps, the matching is positive assortative matching.

Proof of Theorem 11
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1. Kamali-Shahdadi (2016) proves that, under Condition 5, the argmax (the eﬃcient effort) is strictly supermodular e∗ij > 0. By taking cross partial derivatives of production
function at the eﬃcient eﬀort, we have:
∗ = v + v e∗ + v e∗ + v e∗ e∗ + v e∗
vij
ij
ie j
je i
ee i j
e ij

⇒

∗ = s ∗ + c e∗ e∗ + v e∗ .
vij
ee i j
e ij
ij

Recall that, s∗ij < 0 >. By Assumption 1, cee > 0, ve > 0. Given Assumption 4 or 5
e∗i e∗j > 0. Therefore, the total output at the eﬃcient eﬀort is supermodular. Hence,
PAM has the highest total surplus, the highest total output, the highest total labor,
and the lowest total leisure.
2. Because the argmax (the eﬃcient eﬀort) is strictly supermodular, by eliminating all
frictions in the labor market, the total eﬀort increases. Given Assumption 4, the eﬃcient eﬀort is increasing in firm’s technology. Recall that, starting from any matching,
there is a finite sequence of meet and joint operation such that the final matching is
PAM. Therefore, it is enough to prove the result for implementing meet and joint operations once. Consider two pairs of worker-firm pairs, (i, j), (i′ , j ′ ), where i < i′ , j > j ′ .
Implementing meet and joint operation is equivalent to assigning better worker i′ to
the better firm j. The better workers, matched with the better firm, works more than
the other worker matched with the better firm. Moreover, this increase in labor is
more that the decrease in labor in the lower firm after implementing meet and joint
operations. Stated diﬀerently, the labor at the higher firm was higher at the initial
matching, compared with the labor at the lower firm. Moreover, the increase in labor
at the higher firm is greater than the decrease in the lower firm. Because the cost
function is convex, the total cost of eﬀort increases as the result of implementing meet
and joint operations.
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Proof of Theorem 12
1. Kamali-Shahdadi (2016) proves that, under Condition 6, the argmax (the eﬃcient effort) is strictly submodular. By taking cross partial derivatives of production function
at the eﬃcient eﬀort, we have:
∗ = v + v e∗ + v e∗ + v e∗ e∗ + v e∗
vij
ij
ie j
je i
ee i j
e ij

⇒

∗ =s +s (
vij
ij
ie
s2 s

−sej
see )

−sei
ei
+ sje ( −s
see ) + vee ( see )(

+s

s s −s

s s −s

−sej
see )

s s

−ve ( ee eij eee ei ej s3eei ej ee eej ei ee )
ee
(
∗ = ( −1 ) s (−s3 ) + 2s (s )(s2 ) + v (s )(s )(−s )
⇒ vij
ij
ie ej
ee ei
ej
ee
ee
ee
s3ee
)
+ve s2ee seij + ve seee sei sej − ve seei sej see − ve seej sei see
(
∗ = ( −1 ) (s s )(v s
2
⇒
vij
ei ej
e eee + 2see − vee see ) +
s3ee
)
(s2ee )(ve seij − sij see ) − (ve see )(seei sej + seej sei )

Under Condition 6, the total output at the eﬃcient eﬀort is supermodular. Hence,
PAM has the highest total surplus, highest total output, lowest total labor, and highest
total leisure.
2. Because the argmax (the eﬃcient eﬀort) is submodular, the total eﬀort decreases.
Under Assumption 5, the eﬃcient eﬀort is decreasing in firm’s technology.
Recall that, starting from any matching, there is a finite sequence of meet and joint
operation such that the final matching is PAM. Therefore, it is enough to prove the
result for implementing meet and joint operations once. Consider two pairs of workerfirm pairs, (i, j), (i′ , j ′ ), where i < i′ , j > j ′ . Implementing meet and joint operation
is equivalent to assigning better worker i′ to the better firm j. The better workers,
matched with the better firm, works less than the other worker matched with the
better firm. Moreover, this decrease in labor is more that the increase in labor in
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the lower firm after implementing meet and joint operations. Stated diﬀerently, the
labor at the higher firm was lower at the initial matching, compared with the labor
at the lower firm. Moreover, the decrease in labor at the higher firm is greater than
the increase in the lower firm. Because the cost function is convex, the total cost of
eﬀort decreases as the result of implementing meet and joint operations.

Proof of Theorem 13
1. Kamali-Shahdadi (2016) proves that, under Condition 6, the argmax (the eﬃcient
eﬀort) is strictly submodular. Recall that:
∗
vij
=(

−1 (
)
s3ee

(sei sej )(ve seee + 2s2ee − vee see ) +
)
(s2ee )(ve seij − sij see ) − (ve see )(seei sej + seej sei )

Under Condition 7, the total output at the eﬃcient eﬀort is submodular. Hence, PAM
has the highest total surplus, lowest total output, lowest total labor, and highest total
leisure.
2. Eliminating frictions in the labor market results in PAM. By first part of the theorem,
PAM has the highest total surplus, lowest total output.

Proof of Theorem 14
In a contracting equilibrium, if i < i′ and j < j ′ where (i, j) and (i′ , j ′ ) are feasible matches,
then (i, j ′ ) and (i′ , j) is not part of a stable matching; i.e., it is not an equilibrium outcome,
because either (i, j) or (i′ , j ′ ) is a blocking pair.
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We want to show that for any given labor market with friction, if the total surplus in
a contracting equilibrium is strictly supermodular in worker’s type and firm’s type, then
the profit of the firm is strictly supermodular in worker’s type and firm’s type. Define
r̂(i, j) = ŵ(i) − c(e∗ (i, j)) as the rent of worker i when he/she is matched with firm j, in
a given contracting equilibrium < {ŵ(i, j, e∗ (i, j))}e∈[0,1] , µ̂ >. Consider i < i′ and j < j ′ ,
where (i, j) and (i′ , j ′ ) are part of the induced matching in the contracting equilibrium. By
revealed preferences, firm j ′ prefers its current match compared with the worker assigned
to firm j:
π(i′ , j ′ , r̂(i′ , j ′ )) ≥ π(i, j ′ , r̂(i, µ̂(i))),
π(i, j, r̂(i, j)) ≥ π(i′ , j, r̂(i′ , µ̂(i′ )))
⇒ π(i′ , j ′ , r̂(i′ , j ′ )) + π(i, j, r̂(i, j)) ≥ π(i, j ′ , r̂(i, j)) + π(i′ , j, r̂(i′ , j ′ ))

Therefore, the profit at the eﬃcient eﬀort level is strictly supermodular. Similar argument
proves the second part of this theorem.
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